Adaptive interaction protocol for multi-agent-based supply network by Ghoneim, Khaled
Adaptive Interaction Protocol for 






The Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Applied Science in (Quality Systems Engineering) at 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
April 2009 
© Khaled Ghoneim, 2009 
1*1 Library and Archives Canada 
Published Heritage 
Branch 
395 Wellington Street 





Patrimoine de I'edition 
395, rue Wellington 
OttawaONK1A0N4 
Canada 
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-63168-3 
Our file Notre refinance 
ISBN: 978-0-494-63168-3 
NOTICE: AVIS: 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library and 
Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats. 
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in this 
thesis. Neither the thesis nor 
substantial extracts from it may be 
printed or otherwise reproduced 
without the author's permission. 
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le 
monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur 
support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou 
autres formats. 
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni 
la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci 
ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation. 
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting forms 
may have been removed from this 
thesis. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, their 
removal does not represent any loss 
of content from the thesis. 
Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la 
protection de la vie privee, quelques 
formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de 
cette these. 
Bien que ces formulaires atent inclus dans 





Adaptable Interaction Protocol for Multi-Agent-based Supply Network 
Khaled Ghoneim 
Supply network is a special form of organization, where two paradigms are combined: 
market interaction and hierarchical structure. Because it includes different interdependent 
entities that should work together, supply network requires efficient tools to support coor-
dination and improve the quality of interaction between these entities. 
In this thesis, we propose a multi-agent-based interaction protocol for supply network 
formation. The main characteristic of this protocol is its adaptability to agent behavior dur-
ing supply network formation. Such an adaptability is needed to form the most suitable or-
ganization structure. The novelty of the proposed protocol is the unification of contracting, 
auction and negotiation in a three-steps solution. Contracting is a planning tool aiming to 
facilitate solving network formation problem through task decomposition. Auction enables 
participating agents to jointly search an agreement space and check the contract feasibility. 
Finally, negotiation is the last resort for agents to reach an agreement. It is applicable when 
agents fail to reach an agreement due to lack of knowledge about the existing constraints. 
In fact, negotiation is used to release constraints when no realizable solution is obtained un-
der auction. The second contribution of this thesis is the consideration of supply network 
formation within a general framework of coordinated distributed problem solving. 
The proposed protocol and framework are simulated through a multi-agent system pro-
totype serving as a proof of concept. The simulation results show the effectiveness of our 
three-steps solution protocol in terms of network formation success, customer satisfaction 
and the total gained rewards of the whole network. 
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"...every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as 
great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign 
industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner 
as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, 
as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing 
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the public good." Adam Smith [116]. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the context for our research, clarify the scope 
of this thesis and state our motivation, research goals and objectives. In Section 1.1, we 
present the general background of supply networks by exploring some definitions and ex-
plaining some key characteristics of supply network and organization coordination. In 
Section 1.2, we present the scope of the thesis and describe our motivations. In Section 
1.3, we state the research problems under consideration. In Section 1.4, our research goals 
are clarified. Section 1.5 describes out our proposed solution and contribution. Finally, we 
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present the structure of the thesis in Section 1.6. 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Supply Network 
Supply network (SN) is a network of autonomous business entities (i.e., customer, 
retailer, distributer, manufacturer, and supplier), and relationship between those entities 
through upstream and downstream links. In order to harmonize plans and activities and 
integrate shared resources and information, SN is considered as a (whole) system to cap-
ture business opportunities. SN may take any topological form and it does not have to be 
in a series configuration. As a whole system, SN goal requires execution of a precise set 
of actions by SN members (sub-systems). Those members are concerned with optimizing 
their own objectives that can be in conflict with each other. Consequently, it becomes quite 
important to find a compromise between these conflicting objectives. 
SN is a "life cycle process comprising physical, information, financial, and knowledge 
flows whose purpose is to satisfy end-user requirements with products and services from 
multiple linked suppliers" [2]. SN is a " network of organizations that are involved, through 
upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that produce 
value in the form of products and services in the eyes of the ultimate consumer" [26]. 
Entities must perceive themselves not as self-contained competitive entities, but as nodes 
in a larger network of intersecting systems, composed of intricate, mutually supportive 
networks of customers, products, resources, enterprises, and information. 
The tightening of the economy imposes leanness, and agility principles: A Lean SN 
"...employs continuous improvement efforts that focus on eliminating waste or non-value 
steps along the network; thereby achieving cost reduction, high capacity utilization rate, 
shorter lead times, and minimization of total supply network costs" [131]. An Agile SN "... 
profits by responding to rapidly changing, continually fragmenting global market by being 
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dynamic and context specific. Achieving leanness and agility principles in SN reduces 
degree of freedom, which increases vulnerability to errors and uncertainty" [84] In order 
to be adaptive, SN achieves responsiveness to both planned and unexpected events through 
scalability of resource usage by mean of evolving its own organizational structure, (see 
Figure 1). 
Source: Adapted from A. T. Kearney (1999) 
Figure 1: Supply network concept development 
Adaptive supply networks possess the flexibility to continually morph their organiza-
tional structure and respond to the environment in near real-time without compromising 
on operational and financial efficiencies. These networks seamlessly connect supply, plan-
ning, manufacturing, and distribution operations to critical enterprise applications and pro-
vide near real-time visibility across the supply network, thereby enabling rapid decision 
making and optimal execution [107]. This adaptability process requires an automated 
support for reconfigurable SN formation. A reconfigurable SN is a "rapidly configured 
multi-disciplinary network of small, process-specific firms configured to meet a window of 
opportunity to design and produce a specific product" [67]. 
SN changes its role in order to exploit business opportunities related to the product life 
cyc/e(PLC)[63]. PLC is getting shorter due to the competitive environment, and it becomes 
a cutting edge challenge. In order to exploit each PLC stage, we need a dynamic supply 
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network, which is a temporary alliance of enterprises with integration and reconfiguration 
capability. The objective of dynamic supply network is to share skills and resources with 
the aim of better response to a business opportunity. When the opportunity is taken and the 
objectives behind forming the SN are achieved, the dynamic supply network is dissolved 
and a new alliance is made in order to achieve the necessary competitiveness to respond to 
another market opportunity [72]. 
Digital technological advances have propelled SN to an entirely different dimension 
by enabling globally information to be passed anywhere and any time between SN en-
tities. This allows partners to create more channel oriented, competitive and optimized 
organizations. This spawned the engineering of virtual supply network, which refers to a 
socio-economic organization created to produce products/services and to make profit. For 
a virtual network to be reconfigurable, network entities should use intelligence and opti-
mization techniques to solve problems and learning to adapt to a new environment, or to 
new knowledge. This leads to the smart supply network, which refers to an organization 
that is knowledge driven, inter-networked and dynamically adaptive to new organizational 
forms and practices to exploit business opportunities offered by the digital economy [36]. 
1.1.2 Supply Network Organization 
SN as an organization is a social, goal-directed, coordinated and open system that must 
adapt to the environment. An effective organization structure allows organizational mem-
bers to do the following: 
• Achieve organization goals effectively. 
• Deal with contingencies such as market changes. 
• Gain a competitive advantage by developing the core enterprise and strategies 
to enable SN outperform others. 
• Utilize resources efficiently in a cost effective way. 
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There are three organizational theories behind organizational structure design approaches 
[109]: 
• According to classical organizational theory, effective organizations have a for-
mal hierarchy, a clear set of rules, specialization and division of activities. 
• According to neoclassical organizational theory, effective organizations are de-
signed with flat hierarchical structures and a high degree of decentralization. 
• According to the contingency approach, the best design for an organization de-
pends on the nature of the environment in which the organization is operating. 
Many organizations are shifting the paradigm from strict vertical hierarchies to flexi-
ble, decentralized structure that emphasize horizontal collaboration, widespread informa-
tion sharing, and adaptability. Chaos theory [120] suggests that organization should be 
viewed more as a natural system rather than predictable machine. The ideas of chaos the-
ory suggest that adaptive systems are nonlinear and made up of numerous interconnections 
and divergent choices that create unintended effects and render the universe unpredictable. 
However, chaos theory also recognizes that this randomness and disorder occurs within 
certain pattern of order. The global marketplace is another self-organizing chaos system. 
No one is in charge of the market, yet considerable coherence emerges from millions of 
independent, but connected, decisions. 
SN organizational design refers to the process of coordinating the structural elements 
of organizations in the most appropriate manner. Essentially, SN organizational design is a 
process of configuration a space of parameters (tasks, roles, constraints, dependency, etc.), 
that controls the organization's behavior. Doing so requires addressing two primary issues: 
how to divide tasks, and how to coordinate the resulting tasks. 
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1.1.3 Supply Network Configuration 
SN configuration problem is the assembly process of an organizational structure of 
participant entities given a local information, and inter-communication in order to trans-
form resources into a composite goods/services. SN configuration demands both group 
coherence as well as competence. In essence, SN configuration formulates solutions by 
top-bottom problem decomposition into subproblems. Then allocates these subproblems, 
tackles each subproblem, exchanges subproblems solutions, and achieves a bottom-up as-
sembling to synthesize these subproblems solutions into an overall solution. 
The distributed problem solving approach for SN formation can be viewed as a compo-
sition of the following problems [32]: 
• Goal specification: An SN has a goal(s), which is to achieve a task(s) by a set 
of activities performed by roles, which are filled by entities. 
• Problem recognition: The SN configuration begins by the recognition of po-
tential out-sourcing, due to lack of ability, or of inefficiency to achieve the 
tasks. 
• Goal decomposition: When faced with a complex task problem, agents solve it 
by reducing it into a set of smaller more manageable sub-problems. The goals 
and activities can be decomposed into sub-goals and sub-activities which are 
mapped to roles. The solution for these sub-problems can easily be determined. 
This approach deals with a problem in terms of roles that need to be played, 
and responsibilities associated with the roles. The central planning represents 
an initial solution (proposes a starting point for a solution) for preliminary cen-
tralized optimal plan for network organization structure, a centralized planning 
takes the form of contract proposal that specifies roles, and skills required to 
fulfill those preliminary distributed plans. 
• Partners finding and selection: the formation of the SN organizational structure 
is supported by providing criteria to select the best partners which have the 
matching skills to fulfill the required roles between competing entities. 
• Goal alignment: A Critique-solution is provided through knowledge sharing 
in order to resolute conflicts by changing proposal criteria (change solution 
capacity with local requirement). 
• Solution synthesis: A cycle of propose-critique-update is performed until a 
final plan is generated, and a social law (contract) that includes the norms, 
agreed upon contexts and contingency plans is established. 
• Task(s) allocation: After decomposition, the final distributed plans are allo-
cated to the entities that could potentially contribute to their implementation 
through commitments to the contracts. 
• Emergence of network organization structure: Once the SN is formed, a rela-
tionship can be established between the agents, and each agent will perform its 
activity in order to achieve the assigned task(s). 
• Monitoring the execution of plan: Adapting to changes in the environment 
through adaptive planning and application of social laws. 
1.1.4 Supply Network Coordination 
Coordination concerns creation of consistent distributed decision making network 
across the entire SN by aligning the self-interests of individual entities with SN's inte-
grated interest. Coordination requires each node (entity) to take into account the impact 
its actions have on other nodes, hence enabling it to choose alternatives that optimize the 
SN's goal. The lack of coordination occurs either because different nodes of the SN have 
conflicting objectives, conflicting constraints, or incomplete information. Consequently, 
total SN gain is less than what could be achieved through coordination. 
A coordination mechanism must be used to insure that every entity is informed of the 
SN changes and can make its own changes if necessary. Furthermore, the coordination be-
tween the SN entities necessitates well-structured plan. Planning is rational and structured 
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decision making process, which aims to find the best choice of objectives and measures 
to a decision situation. Planning can be classified as static or dynamic. In Static planning, 
system designers and/or logistics planner select planning heuristics at the design time in or-
der to choose what they believe to be the best decision for their specific application. Static 
planning provides high quality coordination, but tends to be rigid under dynamic system 
environment. Therefore, it proves to be incapable of taking account of unforeseen complex 
situations [54]. If during execution, one (or more) plan(s) for agents fails to progress as 
expected, the entire plan set is in danger of failing. 
Adaptive planning is a continuous, event-driven and replanning process [77, 103]. In 
the adaptive planning, each entity monitors its plan execution through a repeated cycle of 
plan-coordinate-execute and if there is a new event that causes deviation, it stops all enti-
ties' progress, and triggers a partial or even full change of the previously accepted plan with 
long ripple effects. The development of adaptive planning is however a complex process. 
It requires knowledge-based tools, distributed decision making with parallel computation, 
learning and adaptation. Contingency planning is another means of dealing with dynam-
ics, where each entity formulates not only its expected plan, but also alternative plans to 
respond to possible contingencies that can arise during execution time. These plans with 
their conditional branching are also merged and synchronized, although this imposes a sig-
nificant computational and communication overheads, which can be saved by addressing 
plan deviation locally. 
Planning can also be classified as centralized and decentralized. Centralized planning 
for distributed plans is a hierarchical command driven approach in which one entity acts as 
a central decisionmaker/ coordinator and the other entities act as a subordinates. A central 
decision maker/coordinator forms the optimal plans, analyzes them to find and eliminate 
any conflict or inconsistency between them, synchronizes entities activities then forwards 
them to its subordinates. Centralized planning is the conceptual framework underlying ad-
vanced planning systems software, which is offered by software vendors such as SAP™. 
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The main objective of this software is to consider the entire SN, obeying system constraints 
and accounting for interrelations between processes. Centralized computation gives better 
solutions, often faster, since communication is performed only twice (gather problem in-
formation and issue results). Centralized planning for distributed plans requires central 
coordinator to access all relevant information and to have the power to impose planning 
results on all organizational units. Empirical evidence implies that despite the benefits of 
centralized planning, the firms are reluctant to disclose private information to supply net-
work partners. Therefore, this typically leads to incomplete information and sometimes 
infeasible plans. Another major shortcoming of centralized planning is the little support it 
provides with respect to negotiation process although it is the core of an effective collabo-
ration. 
Decentralized planning for centric plans is a planning process, which is distributed 
among numerous entities, each generates a partial plan. A central entity collects these 
individual plans together, then it analyzes the plans to discover what sequence of actions 
might lead to conflict, and modifies the plans to remove the conflict, then execute them 
similarly to centralized planning. The main advantage of decentralized planning is that it 
takes into account entities' constraints. Decentralized planning for distributed plans is a 
non-hierarchical approach to the coordination, where the planning process and its results 
are distributed. Decentralized planning for distributed plans approach partitions global 
complex planning problem into smaller specific problems, which are tackled by (local) in-
dependent entities through decomposition, aggregation and feedback mechanism. Planning 
usually achieved through communicative, negotiation-like process and grounds on consen-
sus like agreements on objectives, measures and rules between partners. Decentralized 
planning for distributed plan serves to establish coordination between planning domains 
in order to create a common and mutually agreed upon plan [61]. This approach encom-
passes distributed problem solving, since it relies on entities being able to communicate 
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about, tasks, solutions, goals, plans etc. On the downside, this approach is generally sub-
optimal, since knowledge of the system is dispersed throughout the system and each entity 
has incomplete information about the system as a whole. 
Coordination in SN cannot be accounted for without considering the social laws of the 
organizations and the way they constrain the behaviours of individual entities. Social law 
includes the rules, norms, agreed upon context, rewards of commitments and penalties of 
decommitments that aim to eliminate possible causes of conflicts. In addition, social law 
provides a system of ethics and social responsibilities. 
To facilitate coordination, SN information resources ought to be organized and shared. 
The process of information integration in a SN can be decomposed into the following 
components: (1) standardization of information representation; (2) shared vocabulary; (3) 
problem-oriented data conceptualization; (4) transparency of information; and (5) stan-
dardization of information access and retrieval. By presenting information in a uniform 
self consistent way, it can be made sure that SN entities share the same view of SN, where 
the same information stored in more than one of the local systems should have the same 
meaning. Successful SN achievement requires understanding of both the customer require-
ments (i.e., quantity, lead time, product specification, components information, price, etc.) 
and SN functions information (SN echelons, service level, lead time capacity, process ca-
pacity, etc.). The relationships and properties among these concepts serve as the basis for 
the SN ontology. Ontology is a "formal explicit specification of shared conceptualization" 
[44]. In this regard, ontologies can be though of as formal semantic primitives that specify 
objects in a particular domain of knowledge. Ontology usually consists of a set of hierar-
chical classes or concepts, their definitions and axioms about them. It is necessary for an 
ontology to provide a sufficient level of details to describe the goods or services in their 
entirety in order to distinguish products from each other, as well as to describe attributes 
and features that are necessary to determining the value of the product/service. The main 
advantage for having a set of standard ontologies for the supply network is to facilitate 
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the knowledge sharing re-use among various parties interested in that particular domain of 
knowledge. This will enhance the inter-operability between various SN entities. Organi-
zational models such as SCOR and CPFR are basis for supply network ontology modeling 
since they are widely shared supply networks concepts [45, 48, 85, 137]. We discuss 
organizational models in further details in (Subsection 4.4.1). 
1.2 Motivations 
There are three distinguished decision levels depending on the time horizon: strategic, 
tactical and operational. As stated in [113], the strategic level deals with decisions that have 
a long-lasting effect on the enterprise. These include decisions regarding the number, loca-
tion and capacities of warehouses and manufacturing plants, or the flow of material through 
the logistics network. The term supply network design is often employed as synonyms of 
strategic supply network planning [25, 75, 113]. To achieve this, an ideal network must 
have the optimum size and location. 
Supply network is a special form of a network organization. It can be regarded as cross-
hybrid between a pure-market chaotic interaction and a hierarchical organization relation-
ship. It tries to combine the best features of the two. Entities behavior change throughout 
SN formation stages from competitive to cooperative. 
Supply network formation refers to organizational design, which is the process of co-
ordinating the structural elements of organization in the most appropriate manner. Design 
decision depends on specialization and division of task, authority and delegation, span of 
control, and information technology. SN emerging structure follows contingency approach 
where the best design for an organization depends on the nature of the environment in 
which the organization is operating. Therefore, SN organization is an organic rather than 
a mechanical process. As such it requires specific tools of interaction to support efficient 
planning and execution of the order fulfillment process. Supply network formation life 
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cycle resembles a cooperative distributed problem solving process. The Supply network 
formation process takes place in a dynamic and often unpredictable environment. Sup-
ply network is considered as a system rather than a component, therefore, SN integration 
viewed as the process of seeking global rather than local optimization. This represents a 
great challenge, since each supply network has its own unique and complex features. In 
fact, supply network integration requires creating specific simulation models and solution 
techniques as a decision support system. To fulfill the modeling and simulation require-
ments of Supply network domain, multi-agent systems (MAS) technology is an appropriate 
candidate. This is because agents in MAS have varying capabilities and can interact and 
cooperate with each other. The primary economic theories of Adam Smith: the division of 
labor and the principle of laissez faire (free enterprise) [116] is the fundamental basis for 
our choice of multi agent system-based supply network. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" de-
scribed the natural force that guides free market capitalism through competition for scarce 
resources, to trade in the most mutually beneficial manner. According to Adam Smith, in 
a free market, each participant will try to maximize self-interest. The interaction of market 
participants leads to exchange of goods and services, this enables each participant to be 
better off than when simply producing for himself/herself. 
In the digital era, supply network planning should make full use of the technologies 
enablers such as web computing, distributed computing and process integration. Further-
more, these systems should be constructed by elements that are intelligent and autonomous. 
Agent computing and multi-agent systems technology can be regarded as an important ap-
proach in planning supply network formation. Multi-agent systems (MAS) are software 
systems where a set of intelligent autonomous agents interact with each other to perform 
a task. Agents are considered autonomous entities with social ability, reactivity and pro-
activity properties. Their behaviours can be either cooperative or self-interested. Multiple 
agents interact to coordinate their behavior in order to solve problems together. 
In this domain, decision theory, as a mathematical theory of decision making, defines 
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a rational agent as the one who chooses to perform actions that maximize expected utility. 
The problem with decision theory it is normative, in the sense that it tells us what agent 
should do in principle. On the other hand, it has nothing to say about how we might 
efficiently implement the desired behavior. In addition, in order to find a deal with optimal 
utility we need an unconstrained search over the space of all deals and their outcomes. 
Since any agent that we can implement on a computer must have resource bounds, such 
a search is prohibitively expensive particularly where an agent needs to consider a plan. 
Also, decision theory is quantitative in nature. 
Allowing agents to use their autonomous and reasoning feature through negotiation 
will make them able to persuade each other. This will provide another mean of reaching 
agreement in a conflict of interest situation that was never attained before. As a result, the 
quality of reached deals will be improved. 
Since multi-agent systems are systems in which multiple agents interact to solve prob-
lems, agent-based supply network formation process can be considered as a set of inter-
actions between the supply network contractor(s) and supply network contractee(s). Key 
concepts of multi-agent systems are agents and agent coordination. Multiple agents will 
not be able to coordinate to achieve global goal without communication. Interaction proto-
cols are "recipes" for structured communication between agents. An agent communication 
protocol consists of: (1) a set of messages encoded in an agent communication language 
(ACL), and (2) a set of rules governing the sequences of messages (conversation) [96]. 
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) interaction protocols are well 
specified and widely used in MAS. However, they only describe the sequence of allowed 
actions between agents without any reasoning. Therefore, there is a need for a more flex-
ible protocol, where agents have more selectable behavior. Currently existing MAS pro-
tocols such as Contract Net protocol[l 18] are used to do the initial planning, finding can-
didates, and distribute tasks. However, it does not find a solution when there is conflict of 
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goals/constraints between entities. Furthermore, "Contract Net" do not offer argumenta-
tion in order to release the conflicting constraints, and to reach a win-win situation for all 
supply network participants. 
1.3 Research Questions 
We are motivated in answering the following research questions: 
• Which interaction mechanism approach is suitable as a general purpose inter-
action protocol for supply network formation? 
• How does our interaction protocol limit the number of rounds, increase the 
number of reached agreements, and achieve better individual utility? 
• How can interaction protocol adapt to dynamic agent behavior? 
Answering these questions is undoubtedly complex, given how difficult humans find it 
to rationalize the supply network problem solving and decision making process. Therefore, 
we do not expect a comprehensive answer to all these questions. However, we do intend to 
uncover issues the basic involved issues. 
1.4 Research Goals 
This thesis is concerned with the role of adaptive interaction protocol in supply network 
formation within the context of multi-agent system. Interaction protocol can bring several 
advantages to supply network such as adaptive reconfiguration [42]. Our aim, therefore is 
to find a new adaptive interaction protocol model that is selected by agent, in order to adapt 
to different phases of supply work formation process. In more detail, this thesis aims to: 
• Study the environment of next generation supply network; 
• Study and enhance the supply network configuration process; 
• Study different coordination approaches; 
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• Study the issues and difficulties involved in supply network coordination; 
• Analyze current approaches of supply network modeling to gain insight of 
available technologies; 
• Propose an adaptive interaction protocol for supply network configuration; 
• Provide a methodology for multi agent based supply network simulation; 
• Design and develop multi agent based simulation tool for supply network con-
figuration. 
Building such artificial societies of autonomous software agents with suitable interaction 
mechanism for supply network configuration presents a very daunting challenge. 
1.5 Proposed Solutions and Contributions 
Our concern is to build an adaptive interaction protocol by taking the advantages of 
combining contracting, bidding and negotiation in order to improve the quality of supply 
network configuration. Our proposed interaction protocol is based on our analogy between 
supply network configuration and distributed problems solving. By providing a flexible 
interaction protocol that can adapt to changes in entities behavior and applying contract-
ing, bidding, and negotiation in accordance with supply network configuration life cycle 
we hope to: (1) increase customer's satisfaction; (2) reduce the deal failure rate between 
agents; (3) improve the quality of solution by reaching a win-win situation. 
A simulation model of supply network formation is also proposed using multi-agent 
technology with a case study about three-echelon supply network formation from three 
markets in order to: 
• Show proof of concept in the feasibility and utility of intelligent agents in inter-
action on behalf of business entities in competitive and/or cooperative settings; 
• Discover practical implications or limitations while designing such a system; 
• Show that our proposed solution is feasible and useful. 
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1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
The content of this thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an over 
view of the thesis. In this chapter, we present the scope of the thesis and provide the spe-
cific motivations and objectives. Chapter 2 provides a clear definition and description of 
multi-agent organizational structure and coordination, and reviews the current literature of 
different multi-agent coordination approaches utilized in interaction protocols. This chap-
ter also provides a critical analysis of these approaches with the intent of finding an appro-
priate solution with regards to the underlying difficulty. Chapter 3 presents the desiderata, 
and describes how the proposed solution could be implemented. In Chapter 4, we dis-
cuss a brief literature review of different modeling and simulation approaches. We also 
justify our choice of MAS-based modeling and simulation. We describe an example of 
such implementation by presenting a simulation prototype of a case study used to validate 
the interaction protocol we propose. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 5 by providing our 




"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages." Adam Smith [116]. 
In chapter 1 we provided an overview of thesis, and this chapter explores the related 
issues and techniques in more details. In Section 2.1 we provide a brief introduction for 
multi-agent system theory, organizational structure, and coordination. In Section 2.2 we 
critically examine the literature concerning coordination approaches. Finally, in Section 
2.3 we introduce the framework of our interaction protocol. 
2.1 Introduction to Multi-Agent System 
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are comprised of a number of heterogeneous agents that 
work independently and in a collaborative manner to solve problems in a decentralized 
environment. MAS concentrates on the development of dynamic organizational struc-
tures and problem solution strategies for a range of distributed knowledge-based problem-
solving modules (agents). Multi agent systems consist of self-contained knowledge-based 
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systems that are able to tackle dynamic distributed problems. Thus, agents should be able 
to interact in order to inter-operate and co-ordinate with each other, and to learn from one 
another and from the environment. An agent's social environment is a communication 
environment in which agents interact in a coordinated manner [20]. According to depen-
dency theory, agents are engaging in interactions because of the incompatibility between 
their goals, resources and capabilities [21,91, 112]. The general goal of MAS is to create 
systems that interconnect autonomous agents. Thus enables the system to function beyond 
the capabilities of any singular agent. This is because the limited knowledge, computing 
resources, and perspectives limit the capability of the individual agent [86]. 
Various definitions from different disciplines have been proposed for the term MAS 
and it is now used for all types of systems composed of multiple autonomous components 
showing the following characteristics [46, 51]: 
• Each agent has incomplete capabilities to solve the main problem; 
• There is no global system control to direct each entity's action; 
• Data is decentralized; 
• Each entity can make some decision independently and share their knowledge 
through communications; 
• Computation is asynchronous. 
2.1.1 Intelligent Agent 
An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is capable 
of autonomous actions in this environment in order to meet its design objectives[136]. 
Skolicki and Arciszewski [114] defined intelligent agent as an autonomous system situated 
within an environment. It senses its environment, maintains some knowledge and learns 
upon obtaining new data. And it acts in pursuit of its own agenda to achieve its goals, 
possibly influencing the environment. Researchers have proposed several properties that 
could distinguish an intelligent agent [52, 62, 102, 114]: 
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• Autonomy: An agent encapsulates some state (which is not accessible to other 
agents), make decisions about what to do based on this state, without the direct 
intervention of other agents; 
• Perceiving: Through sensors, an agent should sense and observe the environ-
ment within which it is located; 
• Pro-activity: Agents are able to exhibit goal-directed behavior by taking the 
initiative in order to satisfy their design objectives; 
• Reactivity: Agents are situated in an environment (which may be the Internet, 
or a collection of agents), where they are able to perceive this environment 
through the use of sensors, and respond in a timely fashion to changes that 
occur in it; 
• Sociability: Agents are capable of interacting with other agents through a given 
communication language. Therefore, they are able to explore, discover, nego-
tiate, and coordinate, and may be required to understand and reason about the 
goals of others; 
• Rationality: Agents are economically rational in the sense of never accepting 
a deal that would not improve their individual welfare. Agents that follow the 
notion of individual rationality are called "myopic", because they only consider 
immediate gain. Any sequence of rational deals will eventually result in an 
allocation of tasks with maximal social welfare. This means (1) there can be 
no infinite sequence of deals all of which are rational; (2) once no more rational 
deals are possible, the agent society must have reached an allocation that has 
maximal social welfare [33, 73]; 
• Ontology: Agents need ontology to store and maintain knowledge to be able to 
understand each other; 
• Adaptability: An agent needs to learn to enhance its behavior to adapt to envi-
ronment changes. 
19 
In terms of agents' behavior attributes we distinguish between cooperative and non-
cooperative agents; Non-cooperative: Agents are self-interested and each agent tries to 
maximize its own utility. In such as setting, there is no notion of global utility. Accord-
ingly, agents play competitive strategy, where each agent has his own individual goal. In 
our SN formation problem, the main tools that could be used with agents having such atti-
tude is bidding and negotiation. SN accounting systems reimburse competing agents on the 
basis of individual contribution rather than on overall organizational performance. Cooper-
ative: Agents share the same utility function to build the global utility function. Their goal 
is to collectively maximize the global utility. Consequently, agent play cooperative, where 
agents has shared goal. To cooperate successfully, each agent must maintain a model of 
the other agents, and also develop a model of future interactions, where sociability is pre-
supposed. Our work will focus on both cooperative and non-cooperative agent behavior 
and its effect on the overall system performance since agents change their roles during the 
interaction according to prevailing circumstances. 
Agent Theory 
Agents with beliefs-desires-intentions are known as a BDI agent. BDI is a well-known 
method to describe rational agents based on practical reasoning theory originally developed 
by Michael Bratman [11]. BDI architecture is based on Bratman's philosophical model. 
The BDI model addresses how beliefs, desires and intentions are represented, updated, and 
processed. BDI describes an agent's beliefs about the system and environment, the agent 
desires (or goals) to achieve as well as expressing the agent's intention by way of executable 
plans. 
An agent's Beliefs corresponds to information the agent has about the current state of 
the environment, including themselves and other agents. Agent's beliefs are described as a 
set of sentences in a formal language together with deductive process for driving the conse-
quences of those beliefs. It is the basis for all of its argumentation, reasoning, planning and 
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subsequent actions. Beliefs can also include inference rules, allowing forward chaining to 
lead to new beliefs. In general, this information is stored in a database that is usually called 
a belief base, which may not be necessarily consistent. 
Desires are things that agents would like to accomplish. They are the motivational state 
of the agent. An agent's desire represents states of affairs that the agent would, in an ideal 
world, wish to be brought about. Desires are the assignment of goodness to the state of the 
world, from the agent's perspective. 
Intentions are the agents' targets. They represent the deliberative state of the agent: 
what the agent has chosen to do, the agent's committed plans, or the course of action to take. 
Plans are sequences of actions that an agent can perform to achieve one or more intentions. 
Bratman's theory focuses on role that intentions play in practical reasoning. He argues that 
intentions are important because they constraint the reasoning an agent is required to do 
in order to select an action to perform. This reduction of number of possibilities makes 
decision making much simpler than would otherwise be the case. An agent reasons about 
what is the best plan for achieving its desires under specific beliefs about the environment. 
An agent can review its goals and respond with revised plans, if necessary as environmental 
parameters change. 
BDI model is attractive for several reasons [99]: 
1. It is founded upon a well-known and highly respected theory of human rational action 
[11]; 
2. It is intuitive (what to do and then how to do it); 
3. It gives a clear functional decomposition, which indicates what sorts of subsystems 
might be required to build an agent; 
4. It has been implemented and successfully used in a number of complex fielded ap-
plications; 
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5. The theory has been rigorously formalized in a family of BDI logics; 
6. BDI model is useful in situations of incomplete knowledge or limited computational 
resources. 
Although mental primitives, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, are appropriate for 
a number of applications, they are not enough by themselves for understanding all aspects 
of social interaction. 
Agent Communication 
In MAS, BDI-agents needs rich communication and domain language and well defined 
interaction protocols to be able to exchange meta-level information. 
The communication language should provide enough and suitable locutions to allow 
agents to pass call for bids, proposals, counter-proposals, acceptances, and rejections as 
well as meta-information. Elements of communication language are usually referred to as 
locutions (a particular work, phrase or expression) or utterance (manner of speaking). The 
domain language should express proposal (e.g., describing products available for sale) as 
well as meta-information about the world, agent's beliefs, preferences, goals etc. 
A multi-agent system consists of a group of agents that interact with each other. This in-
teraction is generally regarded as the foundation for cooperative and competitive behaviours 
in autonomous agents. The term interaction protocol is used in reference to a set of rules 
that guide interactions. The interaction protocol specifies, at each stage of agent conver-
sation, who is allowed to say what. An agent interaction protocol defines sequence of 
information, by mean of describing a communication pattern as an allowed sequence of 
messages between entities and the constraints on the contents of those messages. Interac-
tion protocol may address the following issues: rules for admission, rules for participant 
withdrawal, termination rules, rules for proposal validity, rules for outcome determination, 
and commitment rules. 
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In order to achieve efficiency in SN domain, agents must have an efficient way to select 
right strategies, and the related interaction mechanism. SN formation task cannot be per-
formed without an interaction method that enables allocating tasks, communicating infor-
mation, aligning performance measure along nodes and maintaining interaction between 
nodes. To avoid chaotic behaviours of agents, a well-designed interaction mechanism is 
conducive to making MAS operate smoothly. Rosenchein and Zlotkin [101] propose five 
attributes necessary for a 'good' interaction mechanism: efficiency, stability, simplicity, 
distributivity and symmetry. This will be the basis of our critical discussion about coordi-
nation mechanism and an inspiration to our new proposed framework. 
2.1.2 Multi-Agent Organizational Structure 
In a dynamic environment, a MAS may encounter new situations where organizational 
structure is no longer the most effective, therefore the organizational design of MAS deter-
mines the performance of task achievement. Since SN organization is dynamic, SN should 
re-design itself to meet task environment changes. Agents within SN are reconfiguring 
themselves by learning from newly acquired knowledge. Self-organization means the pro-
cess of generating, adapting and changing organizational structure, which is the result of 
individual choices by a set of agents to engage in interaction in certain organizational pat-
terns. Consequently, MAS should be self-building (able to determine the most appropriate 
organizational structure for the system by themselves at run-time) and adaptive (able to 
change this structure as their environment changes). As a result, as organization changes, 
the process, communication, and types of interaction change. 
It is the structural organization of agents that gives a MAS the knowledge, competence, 
ability and synergy provided by all its individual agents and represents the value-added with 
the multi-agent approach. Organizational structure can be used to control the complexity 
of both the design and configuration of MAS and of the execution by individual agents. 
In fact, it is possible to change the behavior of the MAS without changing the constituent 
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agents merely by altering the organizational relationships between them. This means that 
the very essence of a MAS implies that organizational structure of the societies of agents 
has to be taken into account during analysis, design and implementation. Various models of 
self-organizing MAS-organizations have been built. For instance, Turner & Jennings [126] 
use self-organization for scalability issues in MAS, where organization plays an important 
role. They improve system performance by the individual agents ability to determine the 
most appropriate communication structure for the system by themselves at run-time and to 
change this structure as their environment changes. 
Agent-based organizational structure design may be imposed or emerged sponta-
neously. When imposed, the organizational structure can be regarded as top-down design 
problem, where solution space is explored and candidate design is evaluated before its im-
plementation [31, 90, 93]. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a bottom-up design problem, 
where boundaries between agents are determined as problem solving progresses, and the 
adjustments to the structure are made in response to current structure performance ineffi-
ciencies to current environment state [47]. 
The supply network configuration problem is the process of assembling complex solu-
tions and the exchange relationship between autonomous self-interested agents in order to 
determine the participants in the SN. Solving the SN configuration problem requires col-
lective effort. SN configuration resembles coordinated distributed problem solving using 
agents. These agents have specialized capabilities and can perform only certain combina-
tions of tasks, or produce certain resources. In order to complete a complex task, an agent 
may delegate sub tasks to other agents, which may in turn delegate further sub tasks. Agents 
need to interact to coordinate their effort in such problems. In coordinated distributed 
problem solving, each agent is provided with an interaction protocol (possible actions that 
agents can take at different points of the interactions) and a strategy (a mapping from state 
history to action, a way to use the protocol) in order to interact effectively. 
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Agent-based organizational structure is founded upon problem decomposition struc-
ture, which defines roles, responsibilities, and preferences for the agents within a society, 
and this in turn defines control and communication patterns between them. This organi-
zational intelligence comprises many dimensions, including communication capabilities, 
knowledge about who knows what and knowledge about norms and procedures. The or-
ganization of MAS consists of many aspects such as interaction patterns between agents, 
agents roles, and coordination mechanism [19, 49, 138]. A multi-agent based organi-
zational structure has a set of oriented functional positions agents' roles to coordinate the 
activities of the agents within the organization for the production of goods and services. An 
organizational structure is represented as a set of rules (interaction protocol) for when to 
communicate what to whom, and how to structure the communication. These rules provide 
strategic-level mechanism for dynamically re-configuring organizational structure. Coordi-
nation mechanism is the main organizational aspect of adaptive MAS. Therefore, dynamic 
adaptation of coordination mechanism is the focus of this dissertation. 
2.1.3 Multi-Agent Coordination 
If a problem domain is complex, large, or dynamic (such as in supply network do-
mains), then the only way to address the problem is by developing a number of agents that 
specialize in solving particular problems. This decomposition allows each agent to use its 
best knowledge for solving the particular problem. Thus, when and inter-dependent prob-
lem arise, the agents need to coordinate or collaborate with one another to ensure that the 
tasks' interdependence are properly managed from different perspectives. 
Coordination can be defined as managing dependencies between activities [69] and it 
includes managing shared resources, task assignment, and task/sub-task dependencies. In 
multi agent systems, an agent often find benefits in coordinating with other agents, through 
gaining information or performing actions toward goals in order to achieve a payoff. Effec-











Table 1: Market mechanisms 
coordination requires management of the various forms of dependency that naturally occur 
when agents have inter-linked objectives, when they share common environment, or when 
they share resources. Ferber [35] described coordination forms, they are mainly: planning, 
reactivity and regulation; Our main concern are: 
• Coordination by planning: This technique includes two phases. In the first, we 
consider the set of actions to be carried out to achieve a goal and produce a 
set of plans. In the second, we select one of the plans, which we then execute. 
It may be necessary to change plans while they are being carried out, which 
therefore means that dynamic replanning options should exist. In MAS, the 
different plans drawn up by the agents may lead to conflicts of objectives, or 
conflicts over access to resources. Plans must then be coordinated in such a 
way as to solve these conflicts and so achieve the goals of the different agents. 
• Coordination by regulation: The principle is to set rules of behaviours (contract 
terms) that aim to eliminate possible conflicts e.g., social laws 
• Coordination by market mechanisms: Market mechanisms [79, 128] is a set 
of rules that governs interaction among buyers and sellers and determines how 
to form a deal in a fair and efficient manner, for different market mechanisms 
(see Table 1) [65]. 
Since actions performed by one agent constraints and are constrained by the actions of 
other agents, an agent cannot by itself just make a locally optimal decision, but must deter-
mine the effect its decisions will have on other agents and coordinate with others to choose 
and execute an alternative that is optimal over the entire supply network. The purpose of 
coordination is to allow agents to produce their local plans with minimum conflict with 
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each other and the global plan. In summary, coordination is essential for following reasons 
[87]: (1) preventing chaos; (2) increase solution efficiency; (3) meeting global constraints; 
and (4) managing distributed information, expertise, and resources. 
Agents benefit from coordination with other agents to solve an SN configuration prob-
lem. Coordination problems arise when: (1) there are alternative actions the agent can 
choose from, each choice affects the environment and results in different states of affairs; 
(2) the order and time of executing actions affects the environment, resulting in having 
agents in different states of affairs; (3) the local changes in the plan can impact other part-
ners; and (4) an agent has incomplete knowledge of the environment and of the conse-
quences of its actions and the environment changes dynamically making it more difficult 
for the agent to evaluate the current situation and the possible outcomes of its actions. 
Coordination requires agents to identify how they could work together. The majority of 
the participating agents are neither obedient nor adversarial, but rational or self interested 
in the sense that each agent has its own goals and preferences. The decision for a self-
interested agent to be cooperative is based upon whether the cooperation can bring greater 
benefit than working alone. 
In order for agents to coordinate, they must simultaneously communicate about their 
plans at multiple levels so as to build a solution model of joint activities, and this requires 
an interaction mechanism. 
2.2 Agent Coordination Approaches 
In this section, we present a short literature review of basic agent coordination ap-
proaches to interaction protocol, and a critical analysis of each approach. Our goal is to 
provide the reader with general understanding of the different interaction approaches in 
order to find the most suitable approach. We argue that existing approaches have their own 
limitations, then we will show that negotiation based approach for conflict resolution has a 
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potential to overcome these limitations. 
2.2.1 Contracts 
In the free market, SN participating members are not under sole control of a central 
authority. The problem is even more stringent due to incomplete information sharing. One 
way to improve the system performance is to achieve coordination among participating 
parties through establishment of contracts. When rational, autonomous agents encounter 
an opportunity to join some groups such as SN, they must decide whether to commit to 
doing the assigned task(s). To decide whether to join a proposed SN, an agent needs to 
asses (1) the impact of the commitment in terms of benefits, cost, and risk; (2) the possi-
bilities for assigning tasks to other group members in an individually rational manner, the 
potential contribution the new members could make to group activity and the costs and risk 
of subletting the tasks. 
Contract as a planning tool 
Contracts represent coordination by planning. The purpose of the planning is to deter-
mine the future actions of agents. 
A central decision maker or coordinator agent forms the optimal plans and analyzes 
them to find and eliminate any conflict or inconsistencies between them, synchronizes 
agents' activities according to schedule, then forwards it to subordinate agents [41] in a 
form of contract proposal. Since the availability of agents for the sub-plans is determined 
after devising the sub-plans, it is not certain that the decomposed plan can be allocated. 
Agents formulate local plans for themselves as individuals. These plans may conflict 
with the central plan or the announced contract proposal distributed by coordinator agent. 
In order to solve this conflict, agents have to interact in order to generate consistent plans, 
by providing their own goals and constraints. The central agent coordinates those agents 
generated plans in order to generate a consistent synchronized joint plan. A decentralized 
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planning approach encompasses distributed problem solving, since it partitions the global 
complex planning problem into smaller specific problems, which are tackled by agents 
through decomposition, aggregation, and feedback mechanism. 
Contract as a social law 
The main principle of social law is to set rules of behaviours that aim to eliminate pos-
sible conflicts. Coordination in organizations and societies cannot be accounted for without 
considering the social laws of the organizations and the way they constrain the behaviours 
of individual agents. A social law [111] is established to prohibit the agent against partic-
ular choices of actions in particular context. The participants enter into binding agreement 
with each other by agreeing on functional and quality metrics of the resources they request 
and provide. They commit to the contract and attempt to fulfill what they promised by 
achieving their intended goals. A contract represents an obligations and rewards for the 
participants in it. 
By definition, a commitment specifies a pledge to do a certain course of action 
[49]. Commitments are binary relationships (legal abstraction)that binds/associates pair 
of agents. An obligation(delivered product, deadlines etc.) is a norm for which unfulfill-
ment is always penalized. Compliance of the norm benefits its addressee agent. Therefore, 
contract can be represented with a set of norms that specify what must be done to consider 
a task fulfilled. Monitoring the performance of task execution based on the norm is an 
essential part of the process. Social commitments [50] are a special type of norms con-
straining the behavior of autonomous agents and the fulfillments of commitments which 
are the keys to successful coordination. Since commitments reveal agents' intention, it 
provides a degree of predictability so that agents can take the future activities of other 
agents into consideration when dealing with intra-agent dependencies, global constraints, 
or resource utilization conflicts. Communication is very important for the agent to decide 
what commitment to make since it provides the information it needs. 
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Contract as coordination tool 
All the trade-off among SN partners are fulfilled by contracts, so all the means that 
help to achieve coordination will be restricted by contracts. SN contract is a coordination 
mechanism that provides incentives to all members so that the decentralized SN behaves 
as one unit. An SN contract terms regulate how partners do business together and are 
rewarded. Contract tools such as discount, penalty, and revenue sharing are a set of clauses 
that offers an incentives mechanism to guarantee all the entities in the SN will coordinate 
and optimize the channel performance. Other tools such as norms, decommitment penalty 
are used to control agent behavior during execution phase. SN coordination models using 
bilateral contractsusually deal with two independent parties. Each party's decisions in the 
SN are motivated by the local incentive of individual partners in the form of benefits, costs 
and the risk with respect to demand, supply or internal process. An SN contract specifies 
parameters governing the bi-lateral relationship, these parameters/contracts-termscan be 
used to entice individual parties to act in a globally desired way. 
Contract as a portable ontology 
A contract offers shared domain and information, which helps agents understand each 
other. Agents can differ in their understanding of their environment, in their goals, and their 
capabilities, but they can still inter-operate in order to perform a task. The inter-operation 
among agents is the result of reaching an agreement based on shared understanding, mainly 
obtained by the reconciliation of the differences. This kind of reconciliation might be ac-
complished by merging the ontology to which the agent involved refers. The word ontology 
first appeared in Aristotles philosophical essays, where it is used to describe the nature and 
organization of being. 
There are four main types of ontologies: domain ontologies that provide a vocabulary 
for describing a particular domain, task ontologies that provide a vocabulary for the terms 
involved in a problem solving process, meta-ontologies that provide the basic terms to 
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codify domain and task ontologies, and knowledge representation ontologies that capture 
the representation primitives in knowledge representation languages [43]. 
Slad and Bokma described the use of ontologies to facilitate the collaboration within 
enterprise [115]. Jones and Ivezic [56] described the environment required to achieve SN 
self-integration, this environment should allow for semantic querying, semantic mapping, 
and semantic inferencing. Smirnov and Chandra [22] described the elements of a general 
methodology for utilizing ontologies in knowledge management for the co-operative SN 
configuration. SN configuration entails managing the supply chain knowledge, modeling 
the constraint network, and managing knowledge among agents. Modeling coordinated SN 
requires specifying the following concepts: activity, process, SN processes and communi-
cation. 
Contract: a critical view 
Supply network formation using contract is simple since agent decision space is limited 
to specific items in the contract. It is also stable since agents have no incentive to deviate 
from the agreed upon contract. It is distributive since SN harmonization models by con-
tracts usually deal with two independent agents. However, contracts are most effective only 
when complete information is available and all future contingencies can be accounted for. 
SN coordination by contracts usually deals with relatively simple structures, consisting 
mostly of two independent parties. It requires knowledge of relevant cost and demand 
parameters in order to achieve perfect coordination. Real-world contracts are generally 
much more complex, consisting of a large number of interdependent issues. A typical 
contract might have tens or even hundreds of distinct issues. Even with only 50 issues and 
two alternatives per issue, we encounter a search space of roughly 1015 possible contracts, 
too large to be explored exhaustively. Moreover, the value of one issue selection to an agent 
will often depend on the selection made for another issue. Such issue interdependency leads 
to nonlinear utility function with multiple local optima. In practice, uncertainty with respect 
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to the future makes it impossible to design a contract with all contingencies included. In 
addition, it is very hard to achieve coordination by setting contract parameters at a single 
point in time. Finally, the central coordinator agent might become a communication and 
computation bottleneck or a potential failure for the whole system. For more details about 
coordination using contracting, see [15, 16, 23, 30]. 
The contract problem is then seen as a constraint distributed optimization problem solv-
ing where a set of variables describing a service are shared among a set of agents. However, 
because there are dependencies among variable values then, the local optimization process 
needs to simultaneously satisfy both the local, and interaction constraints since the join 
solution requires the inclusion of other agents' optimization choices. The local problem of 
an agent is assumed to be defined where decision variables describing a service and their 
preferred satisfaction constraints are enumerated. The solution of this local problem is then 
viewed as an optimization problem constrained by a multi-dimensional system. In order to 
solve this problem, other coordination means are required such as bidding and negotiation. 
2.2.2 Market Mechanisms 
Auction 
McAfee and McMillan [74] define the auction as "a market institution with an explicit 
set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market 
participants". The term auction appears to be derived from the a«crion(increase), which 
seems to imply a dynamic process, where individuals continually change their bids. The 
term bid refers to a bid to buy or offer to sell. Auction is a binary relationship, where the 
outcome is a deal that binds two agents: the auctioneer and the bidder. Both auctioneer 
and the bidder use competitive strategy to maximize their own utility function/profit. The 
auctioneer wants to subcontract out tasks at the lowest possible price, while the bidder who 
handles the task wants to receive the highest possible payment for doing so. 
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The application of the multi-agent paradigm to bidding can be viewed from two dif-
ferent points of view. First, the mechanisms of a bidding can be defined as a resource 
allocation problem to a set of agents. Second, the bidding can be viewed as a process of 
automatic negotiation, where agents interact in an electronic market environment to trade 
items. The purpose of the bidding is to provide a better balance of resource by taking into 
account interactions between the agents participating in the auction. The use of auction 
mechanism for SN was demonstrated in [3, 78, 105]. 
Auction: a critical view Auction theory provides some advantages for agent based SN 
formation for practical and theoretical reasons. The Internet-based distributed electronic 
marketplace has many characteristics of an economy as well as those of a computational 
system: bids specify a correspondence between prices and quantities of the resources that 
the agent offers to demand or supply, and agents make their own decisions about how to 
bid based on the prices and their own utilities. Auctions are a simple and well-defined 
mechanism, it provides an effective decentralization of decision making. Interaction is 
distributive since Markets are naturally distributed and the resources are heterogeneous 
with different ownerships. Through the use of auction, agents may be coordinated based 
on much simpler set of policies. Agents need not to interact directly with other agents, 
know each other's preferences, nor even know of each other's existence. An auction has 
a minimal communication overheads since it is limited to the exchange of bids. Its strict 
rules govern the behavior of the auctioneer and the selection of a bidder. The interaction 
variables are limited to the price and quantity. 
Auction results in a mutually acceptable solution for both the supplier and the buyer 
while the market forces alone decide on the price and the auction termination. Auction 
leads to Pareto-optimal allocations. An allocation is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal 
when no further Pareto improvements can be made. Moreover, the second welfare theorem 
tells us that any Pareto optimum is in principle achievable via the competitive mechanism, 
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thus under classical conditions (preferences and technologies are monotone, smooth, and 
convex), auction places a lower bound on the quality of solution (Pareto efficiency), and no 
upper bound (any social optimum must be Pareto optimal). A common criticism of a state 
of Pareto efficiency is that it does not necessarily result in a socially desirable distribution 
of resources, as it makes no statement about equality or the overall well-being of a society, 
notably, allocating all resources to one person and none to anyone else is Pareto efficient 
[40, 89]. 
On the downside, out-sourcing decision is based solely on pricing where other criteria 
are not traded off with price, therefore three is a big chance of conflict. Since agents are 
dealing with only one variable, conflict in agents goals and constraints may results failed 
bid [28, 110]. Agents are only allowed to exchange proposals. In addition, agents utilities 
or preferences are assumed fixed [8, 133]. Moreover, there is only one bidder that is 
selected in the outcome. Other problems may arise such as bidder collusion and lying 
[105]. 
Negotiation 
SN is required to comply with customer orders even if it may be hard to do so. SN 
have to respond to the orders quickly and efficiently in the limited time available to fulfill 
the customers requirements. To coordinate different SN entities and solve problems they 
encounter, negotiation decisions have been identified as crucial for successful global SN. 
Negotiation techniques are used to overcome conflicts, and to come to an agreement among 
agents. Conflict is a consequence of failed coordination interaction attempt e.g., bidding 
[28, 110]. Conflict corresponds to the terms: inconsistency, contradictory or incomplete 
knowledge. Since agents are autonomous, they have control over their internal state, and 
will not simply perform an action because another agent wants them to. It is therefore 
necessary for the collective to come to some agreement about exactly which course of 
action they will follow. Such an agreement is reached via negotiation. 
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Negotiation is a basic mechanism for interaction that allows the members in a MAS, 
who have conflicting intrests/goals to coordinate their actions to find a compromise to an 
issue [132]. The negotiation are intended to improve the global state of affairs or to achieve 
individual agent's objectives such as: minimizing the time to find a solution, minimizing 
the total resources usage, maximizing results' quantity, trying to achieve Pareto efficiency. 
The negotiation process progresses through a dialogue in which offers and counter-offers 
are exchanged in a common effort to advance towards a mutual agreement. 
The major features of negotiation are: (1) the communication language used by the 
participating agents; (2) the protocol followed by the agents as they negotiate, which de-
fines the proposals that agents can make as a function of prior negotiation history; (3) the 
decision process that each agent uses to determine its positions, concessions, and criteria 
for agreement; (4) a negotiation set, which represents the space of possible proposals that 
agents make; (5) A collection of agent's strategies within the rules of the protocol, one for 
each agent, which determines what proposals the agents will make; and (6) the information 
they know about each other. 
Negotiation is a process by which agents communicate and compromise to reach a 
joint decision on matters of mutual interest, each trying to maximize their own individual 
utilities. The agents first communicate their positions which might conflict, then try to 
move toward an agreement by making concessions, searching for alternatives and argue 
about it. Negotiation may fail if the participants are unable to reach an agreement, due 
to some irreconcilable differences. For more details about negotiation in SN context, see 
[55, 59, 68]. 
Negotiation is either competitive or cooperative. Bargaining negotiation is competitive 
negotiation by means of resolving a conflict over a single mutually exclusive goal (one 
dimension) (e.g., bidding operates only within price dimension). Competitive negotiation 
is a win-lose negotiation. The cooperative negotiation on the other hand, allows agents 
to negotiate over multiple interdependent, but non-mutually preclusive goals (dimensions), 
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cooperative negotiation is a win-win negotiation [64]. 
Negotiation: a critical view Through the use of autonomous agents, which negotiate on 
behalf of their owners, a business can obtain flexibility in prices and goods, and go beyond 
price competition. 
Negotiation processes between autonomous agents are costly in terms of communica-
tion and computation overheads. If there is no efficient way to negotiate, the negotiating 
overhead will become a bottleneck, which will reduce the efficiency of agent especially 
when the environment is dynamic. Negotiation may fail if the participants are unable to 
reach an agreement, due to some irreconcilable differences. In order to find solution that 
meets the needs of both sides, negotiation should run on multiple issues. A multi attribute 
negotiation might overcome the problem of empty negotiation space but on the account of 
complexity. If we have a set of attributes A\,--- , Am where each attribute Ai can take a 
set of values aiti, • • • , aitn, then the size of the space of possible deals is n"=i(^)- The 
space grows as the number of attributes and the number of possible attributes values in-
crease. When there is a time constraint, it is infeasible to consider every possible allocation 
solution. 
Supply network formation problemis represented by a multi-linked negotiation problem 
occurring in a multi-task resources-sharing environment. When an agent needs to negotiate 
multiple, related negotiation issues with other agents about different subjects, the nego-
tiation over one subject has influence on negotiations over other subjects. Dealing with 
this negotiation independently and concurrently ignoring their interactions will not lead to 
find a combined feasible solution that satisfies all constraints without re-negotiation over 
already "settled" issues. 
Dealing sequentially with negotiation one at a time and base later negotiation on the re-
sult of earlier negotiation will take up valuable time and therefore reduce time available for 
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solving the problem. This leads to reducing potential solution space specially when negoti-
ation deadline taken into consideration. Additionally, given that the result of later negotia-
tions are uncertain, since agent does not have complete knowledge about other agent's state, 
makes it harder to evaluate a commitment and thus making it harder to find a local solu-
tion that will contribute effectively to a good global solution. Negotiations between human 
participants, however, are richer and more complex than the mere exchange of quantitative 
offers and counter-offers. Participants request information from each other, collectively 
seeking common information, try to persuade each other of contested propositions, and 
advance arguments for their own offers and against those of others. This richness has been 
recognized by the use of argumentation in multi-agent systems design. Agents may not 
only present offers in a negotiation, but also the reasons for the offers, any qualifications 
of, and conditions on them, and reactions to them. 
Game theory-based negotiation assumes that agents have complete information about 
the environment, consequently capable of providing ranking of all possible deals. Agent 
preference is fixed during negotiation. Therefore they may fail to reach a deal that maxi-
mizes their utility, and they fail to achieve a deal. In Game Theory and similarly heuristic 
based negotiation models, agents exchange proposal and are not allowed any additional 
information. Agent's preferences over proposal are assumed to be proper in the sense that 
they reflect the true benefit the agents receive from satisfying these preferences, which may 
not be true. The limitation of Game Theory-based negotiation have lead to the emergence 
of argumentation based negotiation. 
Argumentation based negotiation overcome the above limitations by allowing agents to 
exchange additional information, or to argue about their beliefs and other mental attitudes 
during the negotiation process in order to justify their preferences, or influence another 
agent preferences. Changing preferences leads to an expanding in the set of individual 
rational contract. Consequently, improve the quality of the deal reached. 
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Argumentation-based negotiation The idea of argumentation-based negotiation is that 
in a situation of conflict of interest agent negotiates by argument in order to make a deal of 
the best interest of oneself. 
Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreas-
ing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting 
forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before 
a rational judge [127]. Argumentation can serve both as a framework for implementing 
autonomous agent reasoning (e.g., about beliefs and actions) and as a mean to structure 
communication among agents. As a result, argumentation can naturally provide a means 
for integrating communication with reasoning in a unified framework. 
Argumentation based negotiation in a multi-agent context is a process by which agents 
attempt to convince one another of the truth of some state of affairs. Argumentation re-
quires a great amount of trust between negotiators to share private information. The pro-
cess involves agents putting forward agreements for and against propositions, together with 
justifications for the acceptability of these arguments [1, 53, 97, 98]. Argumentative nego-
tiation is cooperative since both parties confer in order to reach a common objective that 
leads both side to "Win-Win" situation. 
In Summary, argumentation lends itself naturally to two main sorts of problems en-
countered in MAS [95]: 
• Forming and revising beliefs and decisions: Argumentation provides means for 
forming beliefs and decisions on the basis of incomplete, conflicting or uncer-
tain information. This is because argumentation provides a systematic means 
for resolving conflicts among different arguments and arriving at consistent, 
well supported standpoints; 
• Rational interaction: Argumentation provides means for structuring dialogue 
between participants that have potentially conflicting viewpoints. In particu-
lar, argumentation provides a framework for ensuring that interaction respects 
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certain principles (e.g., consistency of each participants statements). 
2.3 Discussion 
The question here is which interaction method to utilize to fit the dynamism of supply 
network? Interaction protocol is not only driven by uniqueness of supply network organi-
zation, since it blends competitive market and cooperative enterprise, but by agent behavior 
as it changes from competitive in auction to cooperative in negotiation. According to the 
limitation discussed in this chapter, there is no appropriate particular approach that adapts 
to the changes in agents' behavior during supply network formation at any particular situa-
tion. Therefore, interaction protocol should accommodate more than coordination method 
according to prevailing circumstances. 
Previous research on dynamic selection of coordination mechanisms [5, 34, 71, 100] 
does not show the actual decision making process where agents decide whether to switch, 
which coordination mechanism to use, and how to switch to a different coordination mech-
anism. Therefore we address this issue in our work by presenting such a process. Thus, 
our work is more concerned with the flexibility involved in adapting to coordinating agents 
behavior dynamically during run time, which is the line of research we will discuss in the 
subsequent paragraphs. 
The proposed multi-agent coordination approach we aim to propose in this thesis should 
be flexible enough to adequately address resource constraints (communication overhead, 
computational and temporal dimension versus value of coordination). Our main argument 
is that it is preferable not to choose a specific interaction mechanism for each agent at 
design time, but to develop an adaptive interaction mechanism that is agent selective dur-
ing run time. Confronted with different situations, an agent can dynamically change the 
interaction mechanism according to his strategy, and ultimately, increase supply network 




" Mankind are animals that makes bargains, no other animal does this - no dog ex-
changes bones with another." Adam Smith [116]. 
In this Chapter, we present theoretical background issues necessary for designing SN 
interaction protocol and propose one that meets some basic desiderata. In Section 3.1, we 
introduce agent-based supply network architecture and we formally define SN formation 
problem. In Section 3.2, we present our proposed three-steps solution to SN formation. 
Finally In section 3.3, we discuss in detail our adaptive interaction protocol for the three-
steps solution. 
3.1 Multi-Agent System Architecture 
Multi-agent system is an interdisciplinary field, it is inspired by many other fields such 
as economics, mathematics, philosophy, sociology and ecology. To design a MAS, we 
need to implement micro and macro designs [135]: During the micro design, we think 
about how to build agents capable of independent and autonomous action so that they can 
successful carry out the tasks delegated to them. In macro design, the focus is on society 
design and the interaction capabilities (cooperation, coordination and negotiation) in order 
40 
to successfully carry out the delegated tasks, especially when some conflicts arise in agents 
goals. 
3.1.1 BDI Agent Mental State 
The mental state of a BDI agent at any given moment is a triple < B,D,I >. Agent 
uses set of rules to represent beliefs, desires, intentions and Preferences. On the basis of 
these rules, agent will plan and schedule the actions needed to perform task(s) assigned to 
it. The action selection function is defined as mapping mental states to actions S —> Ac, 
where S is the set of all agent internal mental states, and Ac is the set of all actions. 
Perception 
In order for software agent to reason about environment and take an action, it must be 
able to perceive the state of the world around it. Perception is the information available to 
the agent about its environment. Any representation of the environment that the agent cre-
ates must be derived from its perceptual inputs. Let p be the set of all percepts {pi,p2, •• •}, 
a perceptual function maps environment states to percepts, percept : E —> p. The mental 
state of the agent is then updated S x p —» S. 
Belief 
Agent's beliefs are its current knowledge and rules about present environment state, 
the other agents, and itself. An agent belief gives the agent the ability to accommodate to 
different circumstances. An agent's beliefs are described as a set of sentences in a formal 
language together with a deductive process for driving the consequences of those beliefs, 
it is useful in situations of incomplete knowledge or limited computational resources. It is 
the basis for all of its argumentation, reasoning, planning and subsequent actions. Because 
beliefs cannot be perfect, an agent can review its Beliefs and respond with revised plans if 
necessary, as environmental parameters change. Let B be a set of beliefs, on the basis of 
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the current beliefs and current percept p, a belief revision function (brf) determine a new 
set of beliefs, brf:p{B) x p —• p(B), and B: = brf(B, p). 
Desire 
Agent's desires reflect the goals directed behavior in SN entity. Desires allow agents to 
dynamically evolve by changing their activity while maintaining coordination across range 
of situations in the local domain. Desires represent goals to be accomplished, possibly each 
goal is associated with priority/payoff. An agent's desire represents states of affairs that the 
agent would, in an ideal environment, wish to be brought about. Desires are assignment of 
goodness (valuea9i(eu)) to state of the environment, from agent's perspective. Each agent 
agi has a set of desires Dt C D, Where D is the set of all possible desires. These desires 
are formulae in propositional logic. A state et of environment satisfies a desire dt if e* f= diy 
where f= is an appropriate semantic entailment relation. 
Goal 
Agent's goals are the objectives it wants to achieve. A Goal is defined as being top-
level task, comprised of a list of tasks that need to be executed by one agent. The goal 
of agent agi 6 Ag is a closed formula in first-order logic (i.e., no free variables). An 
Environment state e, will be said to satisfy the goal gt if e* |= g{. A Goal represent rules 
containing information about future, represented by a finite set of propositional formulas, 
and achieved via interleaved phases of planning. 
Intention 
An agent's intention i Q I reflects the reasoning behind taking decision about possible 
plans for accomplishing a task. Therefore, if one plane fails, another plan is dynamically 
issued in order to fulfill the desired goal. 
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Plan 
In most BDI systems, the plan function is implemented by giving the agent a plan 
library. Plan n is a set of elementary actions aci £ AC executed to realize some task within 
an SN, requiring time and resources for its execution. The realization of plan provokes a 
change of the state of the environment. 
The atomic actions set Ac = {aci, ac2, • • • , acn} are the basic steps an agent can per-
form using some resources. In other means, an atomic action is an elementary partial plan 
that can be achieved directly using a resource. Action specifies how the change in the envi-
ronment state is made. An action moves the environment from state e to another e/; hence 
it is a function ac : e —» ef. These actions and resources do not necessarily belong to its 
own set of actions and resources, and therefore an agent may depend on others in order 
others in order to carry certain plan. 
Definition 3.1.1 Apian ix is a set of actions aci € Ac that transforms an input state into an 
output state under some condition. Input and output states are defined by the state of system 
ei € E used or produced by the plan. Plan can be expressed as transfer function: eu = 
7r(eo, ei, • • • , em) subject to B(c\, c2, • • • , cn). Where ci, c2, • • • ,cn are conditions that can 
be expressed in the form of a logical predicate, eu is the output ofn, {eo, e\, • • • ,em} are 
the inputs and B is a Boolean expression linking predicates and represents a set of pre-
conditions, which must be verified before the plan n can be executed. 
A plan library is a preassembled collection of plans, in which an agent find a plan to 
achieve a goal. In implemented BDI agent, pre- and post -conditions are often represented 
as a list of atom of first-order-logic, and beliefs and intentions as ground of atoms of first-
order-logic. A pre-condition defines the circumstances under which a plan is applicable. 
A post-condition defines what states of affairs the plan achieves. Finding a plan to achieve 
an intention is reduced to finding a plan whose precondition matches the agent's beliefs 
and whose post-condition matches the intention. Different candidate plans are generated 
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to achieve a particular set of desires. 
Agent try to minimize the amount of resources needed to perform a task, and to schedule 
its related plans and actions during run time in the most optimal way in order to successfully 
complete it by its deadline. Plans and actions can be characterized by two parameters, time 
and cost: Time is used to represent the duration of an action or a plan, it can be represented 
by a scalar function as follows: Let ac e Ac be the set of actions, and R+ the set of positive 
real numbers. The duration of an action ac G Ac is denoted by Execution : Ac —• R+. Cost is 
a measure of amount of resources used for an action or a plan to perform or delegate a task. 
The function Cost: Ac —> R+ returns the cost of using resources for a particular action act. 
Usually, it is not possible to know exactly the duration and the cost of an action in advance. 
The duration can be defined by its mean value /J,(texecMi0:iac) in deterministic case, or it can 
be bounded by its lower and upper duration values {mm(iexecuti()nac) 
stochastic case. Similarly, cost can be defined by its mean values, or by it can be bounded 
by its lower and upper cost values. However, it should be noted that cost may depend on 
the duration of the action. The cost function may have parameters other than the plan's 
action, such as the initial state and domain dependent variables. 
Agent's Preference 
Decision theory (a mathematical theory of rational decision making) defines a rational 
agent as one that maximizes expected utility. The rationality of agents is represented in 
terms of some form of utility functions and preference relationship which enable agents to 
evaluate and compare different alternatives. A utility function is to make rational decision 
on selecting tasks according to certain constraints and preferences, where preference among 
alternative is represented by the relation ^ . A utility is a numeric value representing how 
i 
valuable the state is. The utility of an agent agi is often described in terms of a utility 
function u*:^ —> R, which assigns a real number to each possible alternative that captures 
the levels of satisfaction of an agent with particular task. 
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In order to get the agent to do the task, we need to define task specifications in terms 
of reward and cost in order to get the agent to do the task. A task specification would be 
associating a task to utility value related to its related environment state, and associating 
a cost value of reaching task related state. Let E = {ei, e2,...} be a set of outcomes of 
plans or states that agent have preferences over. The utility of an environment state e^  € E 
for the agent agt be given by a function U{\E —> R, where E — {ei, e2,...} is the set of 
environment states. The goal of the agent is to strive to bring about the state of environment 
with the greatest value: i.e., for an agent agi eo >? eu iff Ui(eo) > Ui(eu). 
i 
A one-agent-plan iTi = {aci, ac2, • • • , ack} is said to move the world from state eo to 
state eu e E. There exists a cost function Cost(7Tj) = E£=1Cost(acfc) over one-agent plans; 
The goal of the agent is to try to bring about the desired state of environment eu € E 
by choosing the best plan, where E = {ei, e2,...} is the set of outcomes of plans and 
the states that agent have preferences over. The best plan ir* is the minimal cost plan: 
min Cost(e0 -^ eu) that moves the world form state e0 to the state eu for agent ag^ 
eo,eu€£ 
In order to analyze how agent might be expected to behave, we need to specify how they 
are motivated. It is crucial to define the payoff for each agent in order to choose certain 
plan. Payoff function is an assessment criteria that assign a utility value for each state it 
desires to reach and cost value for the plans it requires. 
Definition 3.1.2 Payoff of plan ix for an agent agi that moves the environment state from 
eo to eu is defined as: 
p
ayoffagi{n,eo,eu) = Ui(eu) - Costagi(nj,e0,eu) (1) 
Where uaffi(eu) denotes worth of environment state to agent agit Costagi(^j, eo, eu) denotes 
the cost of the plan, and eu (= 7r(eo) denotes executing plan n results moving the environ-
ment form eo to eu. 
Payoff function captures the degree of their willingness to act on a plan. The goal of 
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the agent is to bring about the state of environment with the greatest payoff value, by the 
choosing the plan between within a set of plans that maximizes payoff value. Thereby the 
best plan for an agent agt that moves the environment form state e0 to state eu is a plan 
7r*(e0, eu) such that Payoff^.(TT*, e0, eu) > Payoffaft(7r{, e0, e„) for all < ^ 71?. 
3.1.2 Agent-Based Supply Network: Definition 
Agent-based supply network (ABSN) is a system of inter-dependent agents from dif-
ferent group sets (markets), where individual agents compete to become partners of ABSN, 
interact in order to achieve tasks they are committed to. Through their striving to maximize 
their own goal they maximize ABSN global goal. ABSN is a dynamic organization, where 
the organizational structure of the system is changing over time, with agents entering and 
leaving. This adaptive organization motivates our approach to dynamically reallocating 
tasks and resources in MAS. 
ABSN can be defined as a graph G that expresses the organizational structure of SN. 
This graph comprises a finite set of edges E and nodes N . Edges represents information 
flow and task inter-dependency relationship. Nodes represents roles that represents the 
functions of the system, that to be designated by candidate agents. Horizontally SN is 
made from peers from similar markets. Vertically SN is made of precedent and subsequent 
agents. SN head has only precedent agents, and SN tail has only subsequent agents. An 
SN participant in the middle level of SN changes roles between precedent (the customer) 
to subsequent (the supplier) [60]. Let c C C where C is set of end customers, mp C MP 
where MP is the set of participant in the middle level, and s C S where S is set end 
suppliers, then SN is formed by c U mp U s. 
ABSN can be seen as a complex dynamic system made of competitive and/or coop-
erative concurrent agents, where each agent processes some activities that is triggered by 
some environment events. Agent-based supply network has a goal (or a set of goals) that 
is/are achieved by a set of tasks T = {t\, • • • ,tn} that are accomplished by a set of roles 
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R = {ri, • • • , rn}. A set of agents Ag — {agi, • • • , agn} are required to meet those roles. 
A role requires a certain set of skills that are necessary to execute plans 7Tj, which are a set 
of actions acj. The agent that is willing to fill the role and meets the skills requirement 
become a candidate for an organizational entity (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Individual agent role in agent-based supply network 
ABSN has a global goal that is achieved by a set of tasks that are performed by a set 
of agents' roles that moves the environment from initial state e0 to the desired state eu. 
The global plan comprises a global schedule and a set of joint plans. A global schedule 
coordinates the set of joint plans by taking into account their interdependencies. The joint 
plan 
^agi,agj — ^agi U ^agj is & joint schedule and joint function between agent agi and agi. 
The joint schedule scagiiagj is a partial order over the union of actions aci U acj in the 
joint plan. The joint function 7raffii0gj.:eo —» eu executed by both agents agi and agj. Where 
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e0, eu e E is the set of all possible environment. When there exists no realizable joint plan 
7Ta9i U nagj 7^  0 that moves the environment from its initial state eo to a desired state eu, 
then negotiation space over joint plans is empty. When negotiation space is empty, we call 
it a conflict situation. 
Supply Network Formation 
SN organizational structure formation problem is similar to coordinated distributed 
problem solving. SN agents cooperatively try to solve problems by using their local ex-
pertise and information to individually solve subproblems; These subproblems solutions 
in turn synthesized into a global solution. Distributed agents have control of some vari-
ables, attempt to optimize their local payoff/utility function. The achievement of the global 
objective function is characterized by the aggregation of distributed constraint local utility 
function. 
The SN formation problems have input and output: The input is a set of agents con-
trolling some amount of resources and a set of tasks requiring some amount of resources 
and worthing some utility or payoff. The output solution is a network that assigns a set 
of agents to a set of task. SN formation problem refers to the process of configuring the 
organizational parameters, which are the property of the organizational entity in order to 
find such an organizational structure os* £ Os that fulfills SN global goal. This optimal or-
ganizational structure that maximizes the social welfare of SN agents set Ag is represented 
by: 
os* = argmax U(oSi) (2) 
osi€Oa 
Where 
• Os = {osi, 0S2, • • • , osn} is a set of possible organizational structures (net-
works); 
• osi = {oei, oe2, • • • , oem} is a task assignment vector of a set of organizational 
48 
entities (nodes); 
• The global utility U(osi) is the sum of the utilities on all the nodes U(osi) = 
E u(oej); 
oej €osi 
• oej =< agj,rj, tj > is the organizational entity that is to be filled by an agent; 
• u(oej) is the utility function for each organizational entity. 
Task Delegation Supply network is a network of agents (nodes) working together to 
solve problems that are beyond their individual capabilities. As agents have different ca-
pabilities, if an agent does not have the resources to execute a task on its own and the task 
is decomposable, agent breaks down the task into sub-tasks, and delegate it to a group of 
agents. If the agent does not have all the resources needed to accomplish the task, and the 
task is not decomposable, then it is said that the agent cannot execute that task. We can 
define the potential for outsourcing with respect to agent's goal G$. There exist a potential 
for outsourcing for agent agi if: 
1. There is some agents that belongs to different groups (markets), such that agent agi 
believes that these agents can jointly achieve Gi and, 
2. Agent agi cannot achieve Gj in isolation and, 
3. Agent agi believes that every action aci needed to be outsourced is necessary to 
achieve Gi. 
Partner Selection Since each agent (agi) is keen to find its appropriate joint plan partner 
at each neighboring market, the network formation goal boils down to finding optimal task 
assignment subset between two partners, such that each task's requirements is satisfied 
and both agent's utility maximized. Let ue(agi, agj) be a utility generated on the edge e 
between agi and agj. This represents the reward generated on the edge between oti and 
oej, contingent simultaneously on the values of both variables (uagiiagj, uaghagi) and hence 
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referred to as a constraint. The organizational structure design problem is then simplified 
into finding the agent that maximizes bilateral welfare, i.e., V agt the problem is to find the 
candidate agent such that: 
ag* = argmax ue{agi,agj} (3) 
agj €Ag 
Then the global SN utility U(oSi) is the sum of the rewards on all the edges according to 
the assignment of tasks of oej G os. 
As agents work together, they face two constraints: First, their individual solution to 
subproblems must be integrated into an overall solution. Therefore, they must coordinate 
their problem solving efforts using interaction to resolve inconsistent views and reach some 
agreements. Second, limited communication means that agents must rely on their own 
reasoning to modify their behaviours as circumstances change. Agents make decisions 
based on local views that might be incomplete, inconsistent, or out of date. Therefore they 
must use their communication and computation resources not only to perform tasks, but 
also to interact to adjust their behaviours. 
3.2 Three-Steps Solution: Contracting, Bidding and Ne-
gotiation 
Network formations problem boils down to task assignment problem, which is further 
simplified through decomposing it into a set of bilateral joint plan and reaching a bilateral 
deal between competing/coordinating agents. Hence the bottom line to our problem is to 
find the best agent. By modeling the real world, the protocol we specify in this chapter is 
intuitive and offers the basic desiderata that one would expects from an interaction protocol. 
Contracting provides task decomposition, an initial proposed solution through central-
ized planning for distributed plans approach, and commitment in case of joint agreement. 
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Bidding on the other hand realizes the proposed central plan through searching an agree-
ment space and checking the plan feasibility by applying the proposed plan constraints 
to SN candidate, and applying candidate's local constraints to the proposed plan. Fur-
thermore, bidding provides further optimization of the proposed plan and narrows down 
conflicts to certain issues. Finally negotiation is the last resort for agents to reach an agree-
ment. It is applicable when agents fail to reach an agreement due to lack of knowledge 
about the existing constraints/alternatives. The purpose of multi issue negotiation is to in-
crease efficiency in reaching agreements through expanding the negotiation space set. It 
is applicable when agents fail to reach an agreement due to lack of knowledge about the 
existing constraints. In fact, negotiation is used to release constraints when no realizable 
solution is obtained under auction. Negotiation also serves as a source of knowledge to 
agents in order to learn, change beliefs and adapt to changing circumstances. 
3.2.1 Contracting 
Contract initially represent a central planning approach from the point view of the re-
source seeker in order find a preliminary plan proposal. Contract terms entice individual 
agents to act in globally desired way by affecting their choice of local optimal control pa-
rameters. An agent may achieve its desires by contracting certain tasks to other agents. 
Agents divide problem (contract) into sub-problems (sub-contract) and assign each sub-
contract to an agent role (organizational entity), which is to be filled by a capable agent. 
Contract 
Since agents are self-interested, they would only perform actions for one another if they 
receive something in return. For example a Seeker is committed to reward a provider if it 
executes the task, resulting in achieving their own desires if they get the tasks done. 
A bilateral contract can be seen as agreed upon specifications of exchange of 
tasks/rewards between two agents. A bilateral contract f]!;j is an expression of the form: 
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do(agi, Ti) A do(agj, Tj), where agi denotes the agent that executes the task Tj and the 
same applies for agent agj for task Tj. The task Tj € Slij denotes agent agi part of the con-
tract Qij, and do(.) refers to executing a task. Fulfilling the bilateral contract Clitj moves 
the environment to state eu, in other mean eu f= f2jj(eo). 
An economically rational agent accepts only contracts that it perceive as individually 
rational contract (IRC). A contract is an IRC to an agent if that agent is better off with the 
contract than without it. A bilateral contract nitj is individually rational for agent agi in 
environment state e0, if it believes that V f^ - e Titj uagi(QljC, e0) > uagi(ttij, e0), where 
Tij is the set of all possible contracts between agi and agj. 
If agents do not change their beliefs, then the intersection set Y[RC D TjRC for agents 
agi and agj is the set of possible rational deals. If rfflC D TjRC = 0, then agents are in 
conflict, and they will never reach a deal unless they change their beliefs over preferences 
over deal issues. 
In the solution proposed by this thesis, contractual agent use contracts for enabling 
social control as a joint commitment between agents to form a social relationship and adapt 
their current and future behavior in accordance with the contract clauses. Contract supports 
social aspects in automated interaction e.g., roles, and interaction issues e.g., termination 
time, winner determination, penalties, and decommitments. 
A Contract clause defines general commitments, which apply to all of the contracting 
parties. Commitments are viewed as pledge to undertake a specified course of action. 
Therefore, agent's commitments should be consistent with its beliefs. 
Failure by subcontractor to fulfill the requirement of contract e.g., meet the delivery 
date of task Ti results in penalty ttaid(Ti) x tardness, where £tard(Tj) is the time by which 
delivery of product or service is late, and tard is the marginal penalty for missing the de-
livery date. In order to allow agents to accommodate new events, contract may incorporate 
decommitment (freed from the obligation of the contract). Decommitment penalty is the 
penalty the contractor agent has to pay to the other contractor agent if it decommits the 
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contract. 
A deal 6 is an agreed upon joint plan ix^ between agents agi and agj that moves the 
environment from state e to state e' G Gj f] Gj that satisfies both agents goals. When both 
agents are committed to a deal 8 it becomes a bilateral contract Q,itj. A Bilateral contract 
Qitj between two agents agi, agj is also an agreed upon and (committed to) joint plan 7TJJ. 
The cost of contract Qitj for an agent agi is the cost of its part in the joint plan related to 
that contract Costj(f2jj) = Costi(7ri)j). A deal is a vector of set of issues {Ai, • • • , Am}, 
where each issue Ai can take a set of of values [aiti, • • • , a^] . Within the proposed joint 
plan a rational agent attempts to reach a deal that maximizes its payoff. The payoff for an 
agent from a deal is simply the difference between his expected reward from the deal and 
the cost of achieving his part of the related joint plan. A deal is individual rational (IR) if 
all agent are at least as well off with the deal as they were with the initial allocation. A deal 
5 is Pareto optimal if there exists no deal that dominates it (there is no deal that is better for 
one of the agents and not worse for the others). The set of all deals 6\, • • • , 5n e A that are 
individually rational (IR) is the negotiation set space. Each agent search space of potential 
agreements in attempt to reach an allocation which gives it as much as utility as possible, 
in other mean reach Pareto optimal. If however, bidding fails to find such a possible deal, 
then a multi issue negotiation will start in order to release the constraints and increases the 
negotiation space set. 
Contract proposal 
The plan is decomposed into task. The tasks are announced among SN participant in 
form of a series of contract proposals that contains goals, constraints, partial plans, roles, 
ontology, norms, and social law. A contract proposal is announced in order to find inter-
ested partners, the entities that are part of market groups, which are interested in joining 
the SN according to contract terms, role requirement and has the skills, the resources re-
quired (organizational entity attributes); And it is willing to bid for the task. A contract 
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proposal is a contract that has been suggested by some participant(s) but has not yet been 
accepted by parties whom role are mentioned in the proposal. After all relevant parties 
accept contact proposal, it becomes a contract. The agents that proposed and accepted the 
contract proposal are both committed to keep their part of the contract. 
3.2.2 Bidding 
The purpose of bidding is to ensure that task(s) assignment, which the seeker agent can-
not satisfy are re-allocated to the most competitive provider through auction mechanism. 
Bidding guarantees that the cost of the allocated task from the global plan and assigned 
to agents is minimized. The system proposed in this thesis acts as a distributed market 
places where providers are available in each market and auction conducted at each market. 
Our motivation for avoiding combinatorial auction is the fact that the winner determination 
problem is an NP-complete, means that it is impossible for us to find a polynomial time 
algorithm as the solution [106], because of the expected wide variability in problem size, 
and because of the need to be able to limit the time spent for evaluating the bids. 
In this thesis, Reverse-first-price-open-cry auction is used. This auction resembles 
Dutch auction in which the auction starts with high asking price, which is then progres-
sively lowered until a bidder accepts the current auctioneer price. Auctionprotocol is sim-
ilar to Dutch auction, where the sellers (bidders) continually lower their price until the 
buyer (auctioneer) accepts the product or service at the current price. The difference be-
tween dutch auction and reversed first price open cry auction is that in dutch auction there is 
only one seller agent and multiple buyer agents, however in our case here, there is multiple 
selling agents and one buyer agent. In addition, dutch auction the seller is the driving force 
of the interaction, but in reverse auction buyer is the driving force of interaction. 
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Bidding process 
Auction protocol resembles single-issue bilateral negotiation protocol, which is basi-
cally an alternating offer from one side. Let ags denotes the seeker agent, agp the agent 
who provides the goods/services and let PPtmin denotes the minimum price the provider 
agent is willing to take as a reward in exchange of service. Let PStmax denote the maximum 
price the seeker agent is willing to pay in exchange of goods/services. A price of a deal that 
is acceptable to both ags and agv belongs to the price agreement interval [PPtmin, Ps,max] 
Wnere rsrnax ^_ rptmin-
The request-for-quote announced should be accompanied by contract proposal, which 
contains task(s) related issues and its value such as time and quality constraints. This 
information comes from preliminary global plan. Auctioneer (seeker agent) receives and 
evaluates bids when bids return, and then determine the optimal allocation plan based on 
the bid prices of the feasible plans related to fulfillment of particular task. The winner is 
the bidder that offers feasible-plan with the minimum-cost. 
After synthesizing the final solution (global plan) successfully, the auctioneer sends 
bidding price acceptance message to winning contractor, and accordingly a mutual com-
mitment is established and a contract is made, and the interested providers who won the bid 
are selected to a supply network partners or an organizational entities. A series of reverse 
back-to-back open-cry concurrent auctions is instantiated where supply network interested 
providers bid competitively on price in order to find maximum utilization of resources. If 
seeker founds a bidder with lowest possible price it means this the lowest possible feasi-
ble solution to the task to be delegated, consequently agents mutually agree to commit on 
contracts. 
However, if auction mechanism fails to solicit bidders to cover all the tasks in the call-
for-quote, the failure handling process would be invoked. The bid can fail because offers 
is not acceptable by the perspective agents due to any conflicts that arise because either 
price is higher than what seeker expect, or because agents object on some constraints in 
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the proposed contract. Interested providers are the ones that are considered to negotiate the 
contract issues since they axe potential supply network partners. Agents cooperate through 
multi-issue negotiation is order to relax global plan issues (constraints). Relaxing conflict-
ing constrains expand the negotiation space and increase the possibility of finding a feasible 
solution. Potential supply network partners suggest counter-proposal, the seeker agent de-
termine the winning contract-proposal through enumerating it payoff function for all the 
candidate feasible contract-proposal that can cover the task to be delegated. After reach-
ing winning contract-proposal, a new call-for-quote is announced to entice new interested 
provider from the related market. Re-bidding is invoked in order to find improve the new 
solution for the unbidden portion of the tasks at certain node, while having one guaranteed 
feasible solution (the winning proposal). 
Bidding strategy 
In the proposed solution, a bidding strategy for an agent is a function that takes the 
last offers made so far, and returns an offer to make next run. Seeker agent strategy dic-
tates when exactly the customer should accept price shouted by seller agent. It is sim-
ple and requires acceptance of shouted price that falls below given threshold Ps,max- Let 
bpt be the current bidding price, us(6) be a seeker utility function, P3>max be the max-
imum price the seeker agent is willing to pay in exchange of goods/services, ts be the 
bidding ending time, and t^ be the auction deadline time. A seeker agents bid strategy 
Bs{bpt, tB, Ui(6),PS!max, tjC) defines the bid that an agent is willing to accept in every run. 
Let t denotes current clock time, the best-response strategy B* is as follows: 
Accept bpt, if bpt < Ps,max, and u{8) > 0 
B*={ mA{t<tBott<tA} (4) 
refuse, otherwise 
Provider agent bidding strategy dictates when the the auctioneer agent should provide 
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a quote. Let bpi be the provider intended bidding price, Pp>min be the minimum price 
the provider agent is willing to take as a reward in exchange of service, up(6) be the 
provider's utility of the proposed contract and Ai be the issues of the proposal. A strat-
egy Bp(bpi, bpt, up(5), Pp,max, A, tB, ^ ) defines the bid that an agent is willing to place 
for every run. The best-response strategy B* is as follows: 
f 
Bid bpi, If bpi < PPtmax, and u(5) > 0 
and bpi < bpt and Ai is feasible 
and{t < tBort < tA} (5) 
Counter-propose, If issues Ai is not feasible and t < is 
Quit, otherwise 
The search for the improved solution along the curve of feasible solutions is performed 
by using bidding decrement. Bidding decrement step size is hard to decide; The smaller the 
bidding decrement step size, the longer time the auction will be, with the higher probability 
of winning the bid. Consequently the more improved the solution. The larger the bid step 
size the faster the auction will be, on the account of not winning the bid. Step size can be 
determined through run time using agent learning algorithm for more details see [10, 12]. 
In our model the bidding decrement is decided during run time by the agent according to 
the following equation: 
price gap Bidding decrement = (6) 
time left for bid to end 
Where price gap is max{0, current bidding price — reserved min. price}. Since agents 




Negotiationis a process that takes place between two or more agents who are attempt-
ing to achieve goals that are conflicting. If participant collectively have objections to some 
constraints, it is necessary for the collective to come to some agreement about constraints, 
such an agreement is reached via negotiation. Negotiation is used instead of solving such 
a computationally NP-hard problem. When bidding fails, information is revealed in order 
to find new negotiations space. Agent may persuade each other about the desirability of 
a particular proposal by introducing new issues, or changing some issues in the proposed 
solution. Agents continuously exchange their information about goals by communication 
until they reach an agreement about the issues they are in conflict, in order to modify the 
original plan to find a feasible solution for the plan by releasing constraints or further op-
timization, after updating primary plan and finding a solution, a new contract proposal is 
announced and another is bid is executed to find best matching candidate, the winning 
participant declare their commitment by singing on bilateral contracts. In the framework 
proposed in this thesis, negotiation can be seen as the a process of joint search through 
the space of all deals (proposed contracts) T^, in attempt to find acceptable contract Q{jC 
(mutually IRC). In fact, negotiation is achieved through the exchange of illocutions in a 
shared communication language. The exchange of illocutions is driven by the participants 
agents' needs and goals. This exchange is subject to interaction protocol and shared con-
ventions on the intended usage of the illocutions. 
Proposal 
A proposal is some kind of solution to the problem that the agent face. It is an intention 
to perform a joint plan. It may be a single complete solution, single partial solution, or a 
group of complete or partial solution. Proposals can be more complex than suggestions or 




Agent may respond with Counter-proposal. A counter-proposal is just a proposal, 
which is made in response to previous proposal. The counter-proposal amends part of 
the initial proposal (which is more favorable to the responding agent than the original). 
Conflict resolution 
A conflict situation is one in which the negotiation set is empty (no individual rational 
deals exist). The conflict occurs when the agents cannot reach an agreement. A non-conflict 
situation is the one in which there exists a deal in the negotiation set that is preferred by an 
agent over achieving his goal alone. For negotiation set to be non-empty there should be 
no contradiction between two agents' goals i.e., Gi U G3- ^ 0. In case of bidding failure, 
agent reason about issue to change each other preferences over goals' issues. 
Multi-issue negotiation process 
It is possible to see the dialectical process as a search process oriented towards finding a 
situation suitable for both parties. In the proposed framework, in order to find solution that 
meets the needs of both sides, negotiation should run on multiple issues. The multi-issue 
utility function approach allows agent to associate a value vitk and a weight I B J E R for 
each issue At among the n issues. This approach presents a quantifiable measurement to 
evaluate each deal 6 for agent agi in a single equation: 
n m 
i = l j=l 
A multi attribute negotiation might overcomes the problem of empty negotiation space 
but on the account of complexity. If we have a set of attribute {Ai,..., An} where each at-
tribute At can take a set of values {oi,i, •.. , aiim}, the negotiation space set A will contain 
nr=i(-^») possible deals. The space grows as the number of attributes and the number of 
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possible attributes values increase. When there is a time constraint, it is infeasible to con-
sider every possible solution. Therefore we use negotiation only in order to reach the feasi-
ble solution area through releasing conflicting constraints of issues. The counter-proposal 
are valued through enumeration of multi-issue utility function and the best feasible solu-
tion (best deal proposal) 6* is the solution that gives the highest utility or payoff value after 
releasing the constraints. 
6* = argmax uagi{6i} (8) 
SieA 
Negotiation strategy 
Let u(8) — f (au(Ax), (3u(Ay), ju(Az)) be a utility function of a deal, Cost(£) = 
Cost(Ax, Ay, Az) be cost of a deal, where proposal issues are Ax, Ay, Az respectively with 
importance factors a, /?, 7 then the payoff function of a deal 5 is: 
Payoff{8) = Utility{5) - Cost{6) (9) 
For every agent there is a payoff function with reserved value. The provider agents 
suggest counter-offer with altered issues values and reasons supporting its position in or-
der to change the importance of weighting factors or release constraints. The negotiation 
continue by exchanging counter-proposals, and each counter-proposal is evaluated through 
payoff function enumeration. The winning proposal is the proposal that provides the seeker 
agent with the highest payoff value. The winning counter-proposal is considered as one fea-
sible solution. The buyer will seeks further improvement to the winning feasible solution 
by announcing a new bid. 
Let Ui(6) be the agent agi utility or payoff of his contract proposal, Ui{5') be util-
ity or payoff of the counter-contract proposal, Ui(5^n) be the minimum reserved pay-
off of any individual rational deal, A' be other the counter-proposals suggested by other 
agents, At be the deal related issues and tA be the auction deadline time. A strategy 
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N? 
N(ui(6), Ui(d'), Ui(6}J%n), Ai, tA) defines the proposal that an agent agt is willing to place 
and the counter-proposal is willing to accept. The best-response strategy N* is as follows: 
t 
Propose 5, {If Ai is not feasible, or Ui(6') < Ui(Si^^)} 
mdUi(5)>Ui(S^) 
and Ui(5) > Ui(5') 
and t < tA 
Accept 5', If issues Ai is feasible (10) 
mdui(5')>Ui(d^) 
and Ui(6') > Ui(A') 
and t < tA 
Quit, otherwise 
Consider the following dialog, in which we assume that the buyer proposes a contract 
that he pointed down to a quality level of 6CT and a lead time of 4 weeks and asking for a 
price of a deal of 100 pieces, and the auction mechanism fails to find an offer: 
• agSeller- I offer you the goods if you reduce the quality to 4a and increase the 
lead time to 6 weeks 
• agsuyer'- I reject! I abide by deadline and I need high quality goods, it is the 
most important issue! 
• ag Seller'- Why do you need a level of 6cr? 
• ag Buyer'- Because I do not want to lose money in damaged items 
• agseiier- I cannot offer 6cr, but if you accept a 4a quality level, I'll change the 
damaged items; quality is less important than lead time! 
• ag Buyer' I agree, come and bid again! 
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3.2.4 Global Plan Solution Synthesis 
Task and allocation mechanism needs to be established from the bottom up, meaning 
that every participating agent makes individual decisions based on local knowledge and 
preferences while considering the global constraints, without regard to global efficiency. 
The global efficiency is generated from the bottom up through bilateral interaction among 
self-interested agents. The seeker agent receives a solution to all of the subtasks it delegates, 
and synthesizes an overall solution. Upon formation of SN, the agreed upon plan is exe-
cuted by the joint action of agents. During this stage, agents interact to execute a joint plan, 
that they believe will achieve the desired goal. Configured SN structure is represented by a 
constellation matrix [42], where the column's element represents different market groups. 
Each cell take has a vector values {A, P, S} where A € [0,1] indicates if the entity is an 
active partner. P e Agi, ••• , Agn indicates precedent partners and S e Agx, ••• , Agn 
indicates subsequent partner. During operational re-configuration, the constellation matrix 
size is always changing based on varying capacity utilization requirements. 
Agents track the execution of the plan through examining the performance against the 
contract norms. When a discrepancy between the plan and actual situation is perceived, 
a plan control is maintained through re-negotiation of existing commitments, re-bidding 
portions of the plan, re-planning for jeopardized goals, or abandoning sub-goals that is not 
needed any more [42]. 
3.3 Adaptive Interaction Protocol 
In our context of SN formation, coordination involves the inter-working of a number 
of agents, subject to a set of rules. The specification of what is possible in particular 
coordination context is given by the interaction protocol. Thus, such protocol indicates the 
roles that are involved in the coordination activities, what communication flows can occur 
between these parties, and how the participants can legally respond to such communication. 
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Agent interaction protocol defines the behavior of a group of interaction agents. It 
describes communication pattern through defining: (1) allowed sequence of messages be-
tween agents having different roles; (2) content of the messages; (3) semantics that are 
consistent with communication acts. Instead of making agent interaction behavior depen-
dent on interaction protocol, we propose the idea of adapting the interaction protocol to the 
agent behavior. The design of protocols that elicit the agent's preferences is a key prob-
lem to social interaction. To gain flexibility, we combine the negotiation protocol with the 
market rule based protocol. Through iterative multi stage bidding and negotiation, agents 
assess how their choices of actions affect subsequent agents and get affected by precedent 
agents. Through the iterative multi stage interaction, agents exchange enough information 
to find configuration that satisfies the global constraints in addition to their local constraints, 
instead of having a global view of all agents choices. Since MAS-based SN has a limited 
number of interaction, it is appropriate to define interaction per-formatives by describing 
agents possible responses according to our interaction protocol. In this way, it is easier 
to verify the sufficiency of the per-formatives through modeling the protocol using certain 
formal tools such as interaction diagram and finite state machine (FSM). 
3.3.1 Interaction Diagram 
Interaction diagrams (sequence diagrams, and collaboration diagrams) are used to de-
fine the behavior of groups of agents. Agent-based unified modeling language (AUML) 
[88] is used to model conversation, sequence diagram in (Figure 3) captures the chronolog-
ical sequence of communications between two agents. The right dotted box in the upper 
right indicates that this a template with unbound parameters. It is divided by two horizon-
tal lines into three categories: (i) role parameters, (ii) constraints, and (iii) communication 
acts. 
The communication acts are represented by the arrows labeled with message names. 
The agent lifeline in the interaction diagram defines the time period during which an agent 
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exists, represented by dotted vertical lines. The lifeline starts when the agent of a given 
role is created and ends when the SN life cycle ends. For each agent, there are a number of 
vertical activation bars. Each bar represents a different agent role or a different processing 
thread of the agent. The separation of these bars allows an agent to have different lifelines. 
Since the behavior of the agent role depends on the incoming message, the life line split up 
in order to describe the different reactions of the agent depending on the incoming message. 
Life line is split into two or more lifelines to show 'AND', 'OR', and 'XOR' decisions, cor-
responding to branches in the message flow. Decision graphical connector types are either 
horizontal line with no diamond symbol depicts 'AND', means all communication acts are 
sent concurrently. An empty diamond symbol depicts 'OR', means one or more messages 
are sent. Finally diamond symbol with 'x' in it indicate a decision 'XOR' resulting zero or 
more messages being sent, the lifeline of an agent role is split accordingly into two or more 
lifelines and the threads of interaction along the lifelines define the reaction to different 
kinds of receive messages. 
Proposed adaptive interaction protocol 
The SN organizational structuring process can be considered as a set of bilateral in-
teractions between agents .This process can be considered within the context of electronic 
market as follows (Figure 3): 
• When an agent that receives request for a task, first it determines whether or 
not it has the capability to carry out the task of such type within the deadline. 
• If the task is not atomic, and there is subtask it does not have the skill to do, it 
needs to delegate this task to its subsequent agents (providers). 
• Seeker agent generates a proposal contract for others to carry out the task, 
and sends an announcement message to all in its subsequent agents' mar-
ket denoted by(CFQ {agi, • • • , agn}, O, I, R, ^st^) where O denotes portable 
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shared ontologies needed for interaction, R denotes required roles and / de-
notes issues variable, tB denotes bidding deadline and tA denotes auction dead-
line time. 
• Each time a new bid bpt is offered it is announced to auction participants 
(CFQ(new-price)), the seeker agent (auctioneer) waits until a given bidding 
deadline tB to see if any participant signal their willingness to handle the task 
at their proposed bidding price bpi. If a participant does not understand the 
ontology or syntax of the CFQ, it replies (not-understood) communicative act. 
As soon as participant offers a new bidding quote bpu the auctioneer issues 
a new call for quotes (CFQ(new-price)) with the decremented price bpt. The 
bidding continues until no auction participants are willing to bid, or the auc-
tion deadline is reached. At this point the auction ends. If the last quote offered 
by a participant is below auctioneer's reserved price, the task is delegated to 
that participant for the agreed quote, otherwise the auction fails (withdraw). 
The participants are informed about the end of the auction and both seeker and 
provider are committed to the deal (accept offer), and the proposal becomes 
final contract. 
• Interested agents respond by filling their values for the required attributes. The 
matching is based on the attributes of the role. The requirements of the role(s) 
are structured into skills availability and capability (organizational entity). 
• If the interested agent meets the requirements for the role, this agent becomes 
a potential team partner. 
• If an agent is interested in performing any of the roles, it requests for more 
information about a specific role (request description). 
• Participating agents propose a bid (propose offer(bpt)), where the content of 
the bid corresponds to the requirement expressed in SN bid announcement 
(proposal contract and Bid instructions). 
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• Customer agent announces a call-for-quote CFQ attached with contract pro-
posal to the preceding providers market agents that are interested in becoming 
partners of the SN. The customer agent informs all participating agents that the 
auction has started represented by the message (inform(start-auction, proposal 
contract attributes)) and announces the details of the proposed contract. 
• Subsequent agent (e.g., manufacturers, distributers) do a similar process to 
what initiator did. Subsequent agent analyzes the required tasks, and generates 
a preliminary solutions (another contract proposals ) that reflect its local con-
straint in addition to the original constraints. If the subsequent agent finds that 
there is no enough resources available to meet the requirements of the tasks, 
then it in turn, asks for the help of its subsequent agents, by delegating these 
unsatisfied task(s) to others, and announces CFQ. 
• Agent announces the preliminary solution within contract proposal clauses in 
terms of quality's upper boundaries (lower specification limits) or a level, de-
livery time deadline, penalties on tardiness and decommitments, product struc-
ture, bill of materials, specific ontology, and role requirement. 
• After the interested partners receive the requirements of the roles, they acts as 
providers, decompose task if necessary, and start to perform reverse back to 
back auction for the task they are unable to fulfill. After they receive quotes 
from their subsequent agents, they evaluate them in terms of cost, quality, and 
time constraints, and return their quotes if feasible to their precedent agent(s). 
• Task decomposition would include further decomposition and sub-subtask as-
signment, recursively to the point where task becomes atomic and the agent 
can accomplish it alone. For each stage, a task is decomposed further into a 
new sub-task. A new "proposed sub-contract" is issued that reflect the original 
constraint, in addition to the current local node constraints. This way guaran-
tees constraints propagation throughout all SN echelons' markets. 
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• Once an agent receives the bids from its subsequent agents, it will include it 
in its own utility/payoff function model, check its feasibility and announces its 
bidding price for its precedent agent(s). 
• The providers continuously lower their prices until seeker takes the item at the 
lowest possible current price. 
• Once the seeker (auctioneer) agent receives the bid, evaluate them based on 
payoff function and select lowest bid that satisfies contract proposal clauses, 
then the auctioneer rewards the contract to the winning bidder. 
• After the auction end successfully, winning agents are notified of their com-
mitments, and become members (node) of the supply network. 
• If auction is successful on agreed upon terms, supply network formation is 
successful and ready for respond to the initiator's demanded task(s). 
• If two entities have the same bid winning price, an announcement that two 
bidder won the bid is sent out and the winner is determined either by flipping 
a coin, or by further negotiation to find better terms. 
• If during the auction process, no bid exists (No offer(reasons)), or non of the 
bidding prices is accepted (No offer accepted (reasons)). The agents may ne-
gotiate with each other if required. 
• During negotiation providers agents argue to release constraints by making 
a counter-proposals (propose offer). Bidding participant agents propose a 
counter-proposal with amended issues supported by some reasons (arguments). 
Auctioneer agent reason about their argumentation (e.g., higher quality vs. less 
quality and more damaged items vs. compensation for damage items) and cal-
culate the utility and the cost function and prioritize counter-proposal accord-
ing to their payoff for those counter-proposal. The seeker agent evaluate those 
counter-proposal on the basis of payoff function and on the basis of quality, 
price, and time constraints, if possible it releases constraints; Other wise it 
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reject it (reject offer(reasons)) 
• After reaching an agreement about negotiation issues (e.g.,price, quality, and 
time), proposed contract terms are altered accordingly, agent chooses the win-
ning proposal to be its primary feasible solution. 
• Once an agreed upon proposal is reached, a new cycle of bidding is initiated 
in order to improve the solution, taking into account the existence of at least 
one solution, which belongs to agent who performed the negotiation. Agent 
announce the new proposed contract in order to find more improved solution, 
and repeat the bidding process until a mutually agreed deal is reached. 
3.3.2 State Transition Diagram 
Agents can perform various roles and can be in different states within each role in the 
interaction protocol e.g., manufacturer agent act as a seller in an auction between man-
ufacturer and customer. At the same time, a manufacturer can act as a buyer in another 
back-to-back auction i.e., in an auction between manufacturer and supplier. 
We use state transition diagrams to model the behavior of our agents within the SN 
system, the idea is to define all possible states an agent can reach, and how an agent state 
changes, they are suited for defining the behavior of one single agent, however they are not 
appropriate to describe the behavior of a group of interacting agents. 
We can specify our protocol as a form of state transition diagram which gives the vari-
ous legitimate states that an agent may be in during an interaction and thus the legal tran-
sition between states which an agent is allowed to take. The finite state machine (FSM) 
diagram in (Figure 4) illustrates the internal processing of agents performing their roles. 
Finite state machine is a model of behavior composed of a finite number of states, state 
transitions between those states, rules or conditions which must be met to allow a state 
transition, and input events which are either externally or internally generated, which may 







Figure 4: State transition graph 
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is in the competitive seeker state and calling for quote CFQ from another agent. Once 
the interested provider agent receives CFQ, the competitive provider state is triggered and 
agent makes a bidding. If it found that it needs to delegate some task, the competitive seeker 
state is triggered and in turn it announces a CFQ. Once an intermediate agent receives a 
successful offer from its subsequent agents and found it feasible, in turn it bids for the task 
to its precedent agent. If it does not found offer feasible, the cooperative provider state 
is triggered, and it rejects the CFQ with an argument supporting it's position. Also if its 
announcement for CFQ is refused by its subsequent agent accompanied by an argument 
of its position, the cooperative seeker state is triggered and it engages with its subsequent 
agent in negotiation cycle in order to reach a feasible deal. If a new proposal is agreed 
upon, a new cycle of bid is repeated to find a better solution (proposal) while at least one 
solution is guaranteed by agent who offer counter-proposal. This process iterates until one 
of the agent "accept" or "withdraw". Interaction terminate either by successful bidding or 
withdrawal as a result of failed negotiation, within the time limits. 
3.4 Summary 
The main problem in supply network formation is that existing interaction mechanisms 
employed may not be suitable to the agent's prevailing circumstances. This inflexibility 
means that the performance of both individual agents and the overall system may be com-
promised. To rectify this situation, a suitable interaction framework is required to address 
current challenges and issues in agent-based supply network coordination. Our approach 
is to design our adaptive interaction protocol by modeling what typically happens in the 
physical world of supply network. Adaptive interaction protocol is using a mix of coordina-
tion approaches to take advantage of each approach (contracting, bidding and negotiation). 
Adaptive interaction protocol is an agent behavior driven interaction protocol, as it adapts 
to agent behavior changes in response to changes in the environment. In order to achieve 
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adherence between bidding and negotiation, contracting, a weighted multi-issue utility or 
payoff function is used to be the subject of contracting, bidding as well as negotiation. 
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Chapter 4 
EXPERIMENTATION AND THEORY 
TESTING 
" No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable." Adam Smith [116]. 
In this chapter, we justify our choice of MAS-based modeling section and simulation in 
Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we describe an example of such implementation by presenting 
a simulation prototype of a case study used to validate the interaction protocol we propose. 
In Section 4.3 we provide analysis of the results. Finally in Section 4.4 we discuss the 
relative work of different modeling and simulation approaches. 
4.1 Motivation for MAS-based Modeling and Simulation 
In order to study the behavior of such a complex system, it is necessary to have a new 
model rather than traditional models. MAS-based modeling and simulation is a new mod-
eling paradigm in modeling systems comprised of interacting autonomous agents. This 
paradigm offers a new way to elaborate systems that are decentralized rather than cen-
tralized, emergent rather than planned, and have concurrent rather than sequential control. 
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MAS-based modeling and simulation seems to be the most promising candidate for the 
development of the SN, since it extends significantly the capabilities of simulation in or-
der to cope with new form of SN. An SN system can naturally be viewed as a society of 
MAS-based on the following reasons: 
• The world is becoming increasingly challenging because systems that need to 
be managed are becoming complex. Many trends are contributing to increase 
in complexity, including shrinking in resources, growing structural complica-
tions, globalization, reduction in inventory, rising outsourcing, deepening in-
formation technology and expanding horizontal and vertical integration. Each 
of these trends increases the range of possible outcomes that must be consid-
ered by decision-makers. 
• Both MAS and SN are composed of entities, which interact according to their 
roles and abilities. These entities have conflicting and competing individual 
requirements. 
• MAS allows the automation of sharing and collecting supply network knowl-
edge and information in the right time, which is essential to better decision 
making. 
• Supply network is a special form of organization that can be regarded as a hy-
brid between a market relationship and a hierarchical organization. Therefore 
main characteristic of a supply network entities is cooperation and competition 
behavior, and as such it requires specific tools such as MAS. 
• MAS-based modeling and simulation integrates different simulation models 
into a single environment without the need to adopt a common platform and 
language and to re-write. In addition large simulation can be split into smaller 
models in order to shorten simulation time. 
• SN is constantly emerging depending on environmental conditions. With 
MAS, it is easy to follow the evolution of the SN by adding or removing agents 
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without the need of a complete reconstruction of the model since agents are au-
tonomous entities. 
• Distributed problem solving mechanism in multi-agent paradigm is consistent 
with SN's distributed decision making paradigm, since each entity behaves 
independently and autonomously, and pursues individual goals of achieving 
local optima, while satisfying both local and external constraints. 
• MAS is suitable mean of representing the partners of SN, by delegating the 
agents to conduct the negotiation on behalf of the partners. The partners could 
then have the time to do the actual work required in the current SN. 
• MAS captures and mimics the organization structure of a SN and the associ-
ated interacting mechanism, as each subsystem can be represented by an au-
tonomous agent, which may itself be a multi-agent system containing other 
agents. 
4.2 Design of Simulation Experiment Model 
MAS-based modeling and simulation starts with simple rules of interaction among the 
individual components that drive the system to the complex behavior. It works bottom-up 
by examining what low-level rules and what kind of heterogeneous, autonomous agents are 
required to synthesize the required higher level behavior. For more work on MAS-based 
SN Simulation, see [6, 38, 58, 82, 92, 104, 119]. 
4.2.1 Assumptions Regarding MAS as SN Simulation Model 
Since we focus on evaluating the effect of our interaction protocol on SN performance 
at the strategic level, we need to introduce assumptions that are necessary to simplify and 
abstract key processes. 
• Each business entity in the network of companies will be served by a set of 
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agents. Following the basic principle of division of work, each agent will per-
form a related set of functions, i.e., each agent will play a role in the node 
where it belongs. Each of these entities will form a "node" in a community of 
agents comprised of several entities in the network. The functionality across 
the SN is achieved through the interaction of the different nodes. 
• In multi-agent encounter, negotiation is done between a pair of agents at a time. 
• Each agent is a utility maximizer. In other word, each agent is rational and 
wants to maximize his own utility. Therefore agents have self-interest in look-
ing for opportunities maximizing their benefits. 
• Agents are honest about the importance of their goals and their options about 
how to achieve them. 
• No agent has a view of the SN or is in a position to optimize the system as 
a whole. No single agent has complete information about the existing com-
mitments of all agents in the SN organization, it has only information about 
subsequent agent to which he delegates sub-tasks. 
• Agents have no memory and they are not able to learn. There is no considera-
tion given by agents to the past. Each interaction (run) stands alone. 
• All agents are using the same strategy, so the winner agent always is the agent 
who offers the lowest cost. 
• Agent's Beliefs are constant, therefore agent's issues preferences (weights) is 
assumed static in simulation. 
• All agents from the same market have symmetric abilities: they are able to per-
form the same set of actions in the environment, but with different efficiencies. 
• Given a set of goals and constraints, agents search for a solution to optimize the 
goals and satisfy the constraints. Agents are constraint-based problem solver, 
given a set of goals and constraints, they search for a solution that achieves the 
goals and satisfies the constraints. They can generate more than one solution, 
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which enables the trade-offs by a set of cooperative agents. 
• Agents have the ability and authority to relax some subset of constraints, within 
the global constraint. 
• Self-interest agents can make effective decisions with local information, with-
out knowing the private information and strategies of other agents. 
• SN is a make to order pull system: no inventory or back order are assumed. 
The applied strategy is "Lot for Lot", where capacity is changed to adapt to 
orders fluctuations. Under this policy, the provided goods/services is exactly 
to the one ordered. Logistic costs such as inventory and transportation cost are 
out of cope of this thesis. 
• In terms of the contractual setting, the supplier is assumed to charge a simple 
fixed unit price (no quantity discount scale). 
• All partners in SN communicate only to its direct neighbors. 
• Standard auction theory assumes that agents know their own utility for an item 
(private value, and maintain upper or lower bounds). 
• Each agent is supposed to have a utility function in terms of three critical fac-
tors: price, time, and quality. The time and quality are predefined according to 
coordination proposed contract. The time value is the lead time of a resource, 
quality is function of standard deviation a and process capability function. Fi-
nally the price is based on the customer's acceptance. 
• The system is assumed to proceed in series of rounds where at every round 
an agent may receive task to process. A task request arrives randomly at any 
instant. No agent knows in advance what task it will receive or when. 
77 
4.2.2 Implementation Environment 
Our system is implemented in Jadex [94]. It is based on the Java Agent Development 
framework (JADE) agent platform. Jadex used both XML and Java and is FJPA compli-
ant agent environment. The framework consists of Application Program Interface (API), 
execution model, and a predefined reusable generic functionality. In order to develop an 
agent application in Jadex, one has to create two types of files: Java-based classes for plans 
implementation, and an XML-based Agent Definition File (ADF). Java-based classes for 
plans describe the actions that an agent undertakes. ADF specifies beliefs, goals, events, 
and plans for an agent. A configuration tag specifies initial beliefs, initial goals, initial 
events, and initial plans. In Jadex, the ADF is loaded first in order to start an agent, then 
the agent is initialized with beliefs, goals, and plans defined by configuration tag. Jadex 
platform architecture includes the following elements: 
Container, which contains several agents. A specific container, the Main container con-
tains a set of active containers. Other containers register with the Main container as 
soon as they start. 
Agent management system, which provides the naming and control access service, like 
a white page, and represents the authority in the platform. 
Directory facilitator, which provides a yellow pages services. 
Jadex Agent Architecture 
The reason behind using Jadex in our implementation is that it it fully compatible with 
BDI model and provides a BDI reasoning engine. Jadex agent architecture includes: 
Belief-base: The belief-base is a set of agent's belief facts that make up the agent's knowl-
edge. The belief-base contains strings such as the name of a belief that represents 
and identifier for a specific belief. Jadex uses Object Query Language (OQL) to 
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search the condition that triggers plans or goals when some beliefs change. Beliefs 
are stored as expressions and evaluated dynamically on demand. 
Goals: Goals are concrete, momentary desires of an agent. Unlike traditional BDI system, 
Jadex treats goals as events. In Jadex, an agent for any goal will engage into certain 
suitable actions. Some goals may only be valid in specific context determined by 
the agent's belief. When the context of goal is invalid, it will be suspended until 
the context is valid again. An ADF will include the contents of an agent's goal that 
represents the agent's desire. The agent exhibits different behavior according to the 
type of goal. There are four types of goals: Achieve, maintain, perform and query. 
An achieve goal just defines a desired target state, without specifying how to reach 
it. A maintain goal specifies a state that should be maintained once it is achieved. A 
perform goal states that something should be done but may not necessarily lead to 
any specific results. A query goal represents a need for information. 
Plans: Plans describe the concrete actions that an agent may carry out to reach its goals. 
In Jadex, plans consist of two parts: plan head and plan body. The head contains the 
conditions under which the plan body is to be instantiated. These conditions are to be 
declared in the ADF. The plan body, written in Java-based classes, is the procedural 
set of steps describing the actions to achieve a goal or react to some event. Plans are 
selected in response to occurring events or goals, and are selected automatically by 
the system. 
Events: In Jadex, these events are presented in the ADF. There are two types of events; 
message events and internal events. Internal events can be used to denote an occur-
rence inside an agent, while message event represent a communication between two 
or more agents. Events are usually handled by plans. 
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4.2.3 Supply Network Conceptual Model 
In this work, we focus on the design and efficiency of coordination mechanism, by 
having each agent run a very simple algorithm. In order to study interaction model, we 
reformulate SN formation as coordinated distributed task allocation problem solving under 
dynamic environment, where SN entities relationships are viewed as customer-supplier 
pairs who interact with another to reach a mutually agreeable plans. The purpose is to 
demonstrate the applicability of the adaptive interaction protocol to this framework. This 
simulation would include the following building blocks: 
Markets 
Our simulation model represents a three echelon network system involving interaction 
associated between suppliers, intermediaries, and initiator of tasks. Multiple agents of 
certain type exist at each echelon forming a supply network organization (Figure 5). 
• Customer market, which contains one customer asking for certain number of 
products; 
• Distributer (intermediary) market, which buys the products from the supplier 
and adds up its margin, (there are three distributers) one distributer in each 
market set, each distributer is served by one supplier market; 
• Supplier market, provides the products for distributers. We have three supplier 
markets, and at each market there are three agents. 
Product 
There is only one commodity, the product contains one sub-assembly part. An assembly 
















Figure 5: Supply network 
Contract proposal issues: 
Contract proposal contains order information such as lead time, product quality and 
quantity. 
Quality The product/service must have quality equal to or better than customer specifi-
cations. The main condition for quality agreement is OD > crc and as > &D, where UD is 
distributer quality, ac is customer quality and as is supplier quality. 
Time Delivery or lead time is the length of time needed to deliver a product from the 
order to receipt by the customer. Total lead time tL(Ni) is calculated as follows: tL(Ni) = 
Qs- x {hrs/week} + ts + tL(Ni+i), where tL is the lead time of node (iVj), Qo is order 
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quantity, and RP is process capacity rate unit/hrs, ts is the setup time, and ^(M+i) is 
the lead time of the subsequent node. Lead time for tasks delegated is decided as ti(Ti) = 
max(0, ti{agi) — tL(agi+i)), where Tj is the task to be delegated by agent ag^ £z,(a<?j) is 
the maximum lead time required by agent agit and ti(agi+i) is the lead time of agent agi+i 
in the subsequent node according to his capacity and preceding nodes constraints. Lead 
time functions has additive property, so the the total lead time is simply the sum of lead 
times from source node to the current node. Lead time function parameters < Rp, ts > are 
stochastic values, determined by continues random number generator. The main condition 
for lead time agreement is tic > thD + £^s» where tLc is the customer required lead time, 
tLD is the distributer lead time and tLs is the supplier lead time. 
Cost Total Cost CT is calculated as follows: CT = Q x CV + CF where Cv represent 
variable cost/unit, and CF represents fixed cost. Fixed cost includes financial cost and setup 
time cost etc., while variable cost includes products/services provided by subsequent node 
such as cost of material, energy etc. Cost function is additive so that every cost comes 
from subsequent stages are simply added to current node cost. Cost function parameters 
< CV,CF > stochastic values are determined at each run using discrete random number 
generator. The main condition for cost agreement is Pc,max > CD>min and Po,max > 
Cs,min, where Pc,max is the maximum price a customer is willing to pay, CD<min is the 
distributer minimum cost, P£>,max is the maximum price that the distributer is willing to 
pay for supplies and Cs,min is the minimum supplier cost. 
4.2.4 Simulation Setup 
Simulation Initialization 
Initial values are randomly generated for reserved price limits for customer, distributer 
and supplier. Quality and lead time are also randomly generated. In order to create ran-
















Table 2: Customer attributes random variables 
N(fj,, a2) indicates that the random variable X is normally distributed with mean // = 0 
and variance a2 = 1. By generating random initial values for every run we can create 
different simulation scenarios. Simulation will terminate according to the mentioned con-
ditions in (4.2.4). In order to generate statistically independent and identically distributed 
replications, simulation replication is repeated for 30 times each run, and after each repli-
cation, initial values are cleared. Since different runs use different random numbers and 
the same initialization value, their comparable random variables from the different runs are 
independent and identically distributed [4]. 
Simulation agents 
Customer attributes' random variables Customer utility function is as follows: 
Utilityc{6) = au{l/p) + 0u(—) + ju{ac) (11) 
Where a, ft, 7 are preference weight, u(l/p) is the utility function of price, u(j-) is the 
utility function of lead time and u{ac) is the utility function of quality (see Table 2). 
Distributor attributes' random variables Distributor payoff function (Definition 3.1.2) 
is as follows: 
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Table 4: Supplier attributes random variables 
where Reward is current distribute bidding price, CostD(6) = (Yli(Ps,k) + CD) is the total 
cost of the deal 8, k is the number of sub-task delegated, Co the distributing cost and Ps,k 
is the price of each sub-assembly (see Table 3). 
Distributors get the bidding prices from suppliers and multiply their price by their mar-
gin (e.g., 1.2 x Cost) in order to decide the selling price. As for time and quality, they abide 
by customer and supplier constraints. 
Supplier attributes' random variables Supplier payoff function is as follows: 
Payoffs(5) = Reward(8) - Costs(8) (13) 
where Reward is the current supplier bidding price, Costs is the cost of the raw materials 
(see Table 4). 
Auction parameters 
Auction ending time: The bidding ending time is determined by the auctioneer agent. In-
termediary agents in turn, announce what is left of bidding time to the subsequent 
bidders. 
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Bid elapsed interval time: The time interval agent should bid within before announcing 
the winner, it is to be determined by auctioneer agent. 
Bid decrement: The amount by which a bid is decreased each time the current bid is 
outdone. Biddingdecrement size is decided during runtime by agent using (Equation 
6) as discussed in Chapter three. 
Payoff-utility-based negotiation 
For every seeker there is a reserved payoff/utility value for its payoff/utility function 
(e.g., Equation 11), which is the sum of utilities of each attribute (in case of using utility 
only). The winning proposal is the proposal who offers seeker the highest payoff/utility. 
If providers' constraints restricts the global constraints, seeker reserved issues values may 
changed according to SN providers constraints' values. The seeker change its constraints, 
if it gets equal or higher payoff/utility value from new proposals. 
Simulation stopping criterion 
The main stopping criteria is: 
• Success in SN formulation; 
• Failure of negotiation; 
• Expiry of Auction designated time. 
4.3 Simulation Experiment Results 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our protocol, a number of experiments has to 
be carried. These experiments serve to quantify its ability to reduce the number failures. 
The behavior of the implemented system is studied by randomly varying the task load, 
as well as agent's capabilities across the MAS. In order to test the protocol, we have to 











































Table 6: Simulation summary results with negotiation 
bidding and negotiation. The outputs of both scenarios then is evaluated in terms of some 
criteria (Subsection 4.3.1). The simulation is repeated a total of 60 replications and each 
scenario runs for 30 replications. First simulation scenario (bidding only) output data are 
shown in (Table 7) in (Appendix A). Second simulation scenario (bidding and negotiation) 
output data are shown in (Table 8) in (Appendix B). 
4.3.1 Analysis of Results 
We based our evaluation criteria on Bidding only simulation summary results as shown 
in (Table 5), and on Bidding and negotiation simulation summary results as shown in Table 
(6). 
Evaluation Criteria 
Customer satisfaction Our protocol raises average customer utility gained, which is a 
measure of customer satisfaction, from 1.40 to 1.55 as shown in (Figure 6). 
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Average customer gained utility 
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Figure 6: Average customer gained utility 
SN formation success A protocol supports SN formation success, if it eventually ensures 
that agreement is certain to be reached (number of successful SN formations per total repli-
cations). In the total of 13 replications the bid fails, the utility-based negotiation is triggered 
and the number of successful replications raises from 17 to only 27. The number of failed 
runs drops from 13 replications to 3 replications as illustrated in (Figure 7). 
Quality of solution We use social welfare [24, 81] as an indicator of solution quality. 
We distinguish two types of criteria when assessing the quality of a task allocation namely 
collectiveness and fairness, both can be described in terms of winning price or utility func-
tion. 
The utilitarian social welfare of an allocation is the sum of individual's payoff or utility 
experienced by the society members in a given solution SWU (os*) = ]P payoff(oe;). It 
measures the global good of the agents. By comparing results from both scenarios, average 
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Figure 7: Number of successful replications 
than average customer utility function results from bidding only, which is 1.40. At the 
same time, distributer winning price moves up from 88 to 93 and the supplier winning 
price moves up from 73 to 79. This indicates that our protocol maximizes social welfare 
by maximizing the sum of the utilities of participants (see Figures 8 and 6 ). 
The egalitarian social welfare of an allocation is a measurement of fairness among SN 
agents, which is the variance of the individual utilities gained and winning prices. The 
standard deviation of both the winning prices and utility gained are measures of fairness of 
welfare SWe(osj) = std.dev. payoff(oe,-). The customer's utility standard deviation drops 
oej €osi 
down from 0.77 in bidding scenario to 0.59 in case of bidding and negotiation scenario. 
Same same applies to winning prices, for distributers winning prices standard deviation 
drops down from 45 to 31 and the suppliers winning price standard deviation drops down 
from 37 to 26, (see Figures 9 and 10). 
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Figure 8: Average winning prices 
4.4 Related Modeling and Simulation Work 
SNs are complex systems in terms of number of entities involved, activities and deci-
sion variables. Complexity comes from the potential number of interactions, occurrence 
of unexpected events, and lack of details during the planning process. Therefore, SN opti-
mization presents a great challenge. 
Since each SN has its own unique and complex features, it is necessary to abstract 
reality and use a simplified copy which is a model, and to have behavior analysis tools 
available to support decision making. 
4.4.1 Organizational Modeling Approach 
SCOR 
The Supply Chain Operations Reference model (SCOR) [108] is developed by the Sup-
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Figure 9: Customer gained utility standard deviation 
different methodologies: Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), benchmarks, and anal-
ysis of best practice. The SCOR model is used to translate business strategy into a supply 
network architecture designed to achieve specific business objectives. The SCOR-model 
is structured around five supply network processes: Plan, Source, Make, Deliver, and Re-
turn. SCOR process design is defined by configuration of materials, work and information 
flow with SCOR's plan. The SCOR model has four levels of detail, the first three are 
process, sub-processes and activities are described in the model, the fourth level, which is 
detailed work-flow level tasks is always customized to an organization's specific strategy 
and requirements. The SCOR model lacks integration between supply network processes, 
moreover it is only a reference model and not an optimizing model since it has no formal 
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Figure 10: Winning prices standard deviation 
CPFR 
Collaborative Planning Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) [129] developed by 
the Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards (VICS) offers guidelines on developing 
shared processes among the collaborating partners for joint planning. This abbreviation 
is used to identify a nine-step approach, which provides volunteer standards, protocols, 
guidelines, etc., which are required or exchanging sales and order forecasts (on a web-
based platform) between trading partners (conventionally identified as the buyer and seller) 
belonging to the same supply network. Under CPFR, both buyer and seller collaborate by 
correcting, adjusting, proposing prices and quantities to reach an agreement on a unique 
forecast, so that the buyer's purchases forecast and the seller's sales forecast coincide. 
However, drawbacks of CPFR exist, and include trust issues (companies are reluctant to 
share the level of data due to a potential loss of competitive information), technology capa-
bility issues, and high implementation costs. For application of CPFR in SN, see [17,18]. 
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Despite its drawbacks organizational models are basis for supply network ontology model-
ing since they are widely shared supply network concepts [70, 76, 83]. 
4.4.2 System Dynamics Modeling Approach 
This approach relies on control theory. The SN studies that are based on control theory 
make an analogy between SN and control systems. In this approach ordinary differential 
equations (ODE) are used to model SN. The model structure consists of multiple inter-
acting feedback loops as basic building blocks of the methodology. These feedback loop 
represents the policies. The main advantage of using control theory is the possibility of de-
ducing the occurrence of a specific behavior mode because of a certain structure, while the 
main drawback of using traditional control theory for supply network is that the structure 
has to be predetermined before starting the simulation. For application of system dynamics 
inSN.see [37,121,122,123]. 
4.4.3 Operations Research Modeling Approach 
This group includes mainly approaches that use classic operations research, e.g., opti-
mization theory and statistical methods to solve real-life problems in operations optimiza-
tion such as plant design, production scheduling, logistics of distribution and inventory 
management. However, this approach also has some limitations [9, 57]: it is technically 
insufficient in handling a high volume of what-if scenarios, and it is very difficult to solve 
a problem where more than two issues are considered. For more details about work on SN 
formation using operations research, see [27, 66, 124, 130, 134]. 
4.4.4 Economic Modeling Approach 
Game Theory (GT) is a branch of mathematics concerned with decision-making in so-
cial interactions. GT can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and 
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cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers. It applies to situations where 
there are two or more players each attempting to choose between two strategies. The pos-
sible outcomes of a game depend on the choices made by all players, and can be ranked 
in order of preference by each player. GT provides general mathematical techniques for 
analyzing situations in which two or more players make decisions that will influence one 
another's welfare. 
A game in the normal form consists of: players, a set of strategies, and payoffs received 
by each player. With the invention of the Internet and the reduction of information tech-
nology cost, certain game theory tools such as auction theory, contract theory, bargaining 
theory, and coalition theory have received attention. GT based approaches assume that 
players are utility maximizers. It deals with encounter of fully rational and self-motivated 
players in an open system. A game is a form of "strategic encounter" between a number 
of players. Each player has a set of alternative actions (strategies) available to it. A cen-
tral concept in GT is Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive to deviate from 
a particular strategy, given that other players stick to their strategies. GT is an essential 
tool in analyzing SN entities that have conflicting objectives, and where its decisions affect 
each other's payoff. As such GT deals with interactive optimization problems. The par-
ticipants engage in negotiation according to their respective bargaining strategies to arrive 
at a "fair" price for the item. Each player's strategy guides its actions at various steps in 
the game is based on the available information. For specific applications of GT to SN, see 
[13, 14, 29, 80, 125]. 
On the downside, GT is normative theory (it tells us what a partner should do), but it 
does not show how to implement such decisions efficiently. In addition, GT is quantitative 
in nature. Third, GT is unable to deal with increased complexity and uncertainty inherent 
in many real-life situation. Finally, the design of effective economic mechanism depends 
on the model used to describe the interaction between participants. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
" The rich ... divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led 
by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which 
would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal proportions among all its 
inhabitants.." Adam Smith [117]. 
In this chapter we present summary of the thesis in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2 we 
furnish again our contributions. In Section 5.3 we describe the limitation of this work. 
Finally in Section 5.4 we propose the future work of this thesis. 
5.1 Summary 
Good design is the key determinant of effectiveness and efficiency of the supply net-
work. While quantitative model provide solutions and decision support for the management 
in different supply network subsystems, the most challenging problem is to develop an ef-
ficient modeling and analyzing technique for supply network integration and coordination 
problem in order to gain understanding of performance. Research generally concentrates 
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on smaller parts of the system without the consideration of integration and subsystems in-
terdependence Therefore, it is imperative to employ both analytical and simulation-based 
techniques, in conjunction with existing methods to develop models for integrated and co-
ordinated supply network problems. 
This dissertation has addressed supply network formation problem areas. We have 
argued that autonomous agents provide an effective solution but need to be given the flexi-
bility to dynamically select the mechanism they use for coordinating their activities during 
cooperative distributed problem solving. We have presented an adaptive interaction proto-
col framework that enables agents to dynamically select the most appropriate coordination 
mechanism in a given situation. 
When the environment in which decision making takes place is dynamic, open, uncer-
tain, and heterogeneous, making decisions about coordination is difficult. This is because 
it is impossible to enumerate in advance the wide variety of contexts in which coordination 
is likely to be needed. To this end, we have developed a decision making framework that 
allows agents to choose their coordination mechanism to the prevailing context. Our means 
to achieve the thesis objective is through using multi-agent systems as a simulation model 
for bilateral interaction protocol for supply network formation. 
Multi-agent systems are used as a mean for saving costs and resources. MAS are loosely 
coupled networks of software agents that interact to solve problems that are beyond indi-
vidual capacities or knowledge of each problem solver. The general goal of interaction 
protocol is to create agent-based SN system that interconnects separately developed agents. 
This dissertation gave an overview of supply network coordination mechanism in gen-
eral and a taxonomy of supply network modeling. A classification of recent research work 
within three groups was also given. These groups are: (1) contract-based coordination; (2) 
auction and bidding-based coordination; and (3) negotiation-based coordination. Second, 
the thesis proposed to combine contracting, bidding, and negotiation in a novel way in or-
der to create even more efficient interaction protocol for supply network formation. A new 
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interaction protocol based upon agent technology has been defined to verify the logical 
property of supply chain interaction. The third part presented multi-agent-based simulation 
system for the new proposed interaction protocol. The final part of this dissertation used 
agent-based simulation concepts to evaluate the success of three-echelon supply network 
and investigate the impact of different scenarios on the proposed interaction approach. 
Although our protocol is intended to be adaptive to all SN life cycle phases, we focused 
our simulation on the SN formation phase. The formation of SN is considered within the 
context of an electronic market place where several parties compete to become partners of 
SN. Each market place provides a meeting place and yellow pages for agents that are rep-
resented by their experiences, competencies and availability. The automatic match making 
and SN formation is supported by our protocol. 
We showed that in our simulation scenario, agents are more successful when they have 
the ability to dynamically select the coordination mechanism during run-time. The sim-
ulated experiment was validated using a range of tests showing that dynamic selection of 
coordination mechanisms increases the overall performance. Our protocol is adaptable to 
agent behaviours from competitive bidders to cooperative negotiators in order to find the 
desired SN organizational structure. 
5.2 Contributions 
In this thesis, we have proposed and developed a bilateral solution to automated inter-
action protocol for supply network formation. To the best of our knowledge, the automated 
system we have outlined in this thesis is the first solution to automated bilateral interac-
tion protocol using contracting, bidding, and negotiation. More specifically, the results and 
contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
• A theoretical contribution in designing an interaction protocol that meets some 
basic desiderata for agent interaction protocols. This protocol is dynamic and 
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adaptive to agent's changing behavior through the SN formation stages. 
• The consideration of supply network life cycle within a framework of coordi-
nated distributed problem solving approach. 
• A framework for supply network simulation and modeling approach using 
multi-agent systems as a test bed. 
• An operational prototype using Jadex BDI reasoning agents. The prototype 
serves as a proof of concept of the proposed bilateral interaction protocol. 
5.3 Limitations 
The proposed multi-issue utility-based negotiation might overcome the problem of 
empty negotiation space but on the account of complexity. The negotiation space grows 
as the number of attributes and the number of possible attributes values increase. When 
there is a time constraint, it is infeasible to consider every possible solution. Another major 
limitation is the data used was from theoretical distribution and was not from a real world 
system. A third limitation is despite benefits of multi-agent systems in distributed prob-
lem solving, optima cannot be guaranteed because there is no global view of the system, 
MAS are less efficient than centralized solution because systems and data are in indepen-
dent organizations, and decision-making is based on local knowledge. A fourth limitation, 
multi-issue utility/payoff function is non-linear equation and may contains several local 
optima and the basic bid decrement iterative improvement may obtain only local optima, 
therefor it is not guaranteed to find global optima. Finally, prediction for autonomous agent 
can usually be made only at the aggregate level since agents' behavior cannot be explained 
in detail because most agents are constructed as a black-box system and/or their behavior 
is determined by "non-transparent" schema (e.g., by applying genetic algorithms, artificial 
neural networks, etc.). 
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5.4 Future Work 
This thesis is about designing a bilateral interaction protocol using multi-agent-based 
negotiation system. It opens the door for several research opportunities. Further research 
may include: 
• Implementing shared ontology in order to create more realistic situations. 
• Extending negotiation to a more flexible argumentative negotiation. Argu-
mentation provides means for structuring dialogues between participants that 
have potentially conflicting viewpoints. In particular, argumentation provides 
a framework for ensuring that interaction respects certain principles (e.g., con-
sistency of each participants statements). 
• Since we assume vertical integration only, our protocol can be extended to 
accommodate horizontal integration. 
• Considering agents with non-homogeneous strategies including malicious 
agents and using mixed game theory to analyze the results. 
• Applying artificial intelligence tools within an agent (e.g., neural network and 
machine learning) and studying the changes of its behavior on the basis of the 
experience gained. 
• A combination of agent-based approach with semantic web technology and 
web services may introduce some benefits by offering interpretability among 
heterogeneous agents, facilitating use of ontologies and providing better se-
mantic support in tasks descriptions. 
• More investigation is needed in the area of determining the bid decrementation 
step size in order to balance between bidding speed and fining optimal solu-
tion. In addition, applying and comparing search techniques may find the more 
optimal techniques for finding a deal from the negotiation space. 
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• Future research should also focus on further validation of this study using tech-
niques such as comparison with other models, historical data validation, and 
formal verification techniques such as proofs, model validation and verification 
etc. 
• Finally, In order to determine its applicability to the real world, the computa-
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Appendix A 
Simulation replications outputs without negotiation 



































































































































































































































"Number of replications. 
bSupply network formation results "Bid/Fail". 
cThe distributer's winning Price. 
dThe winning distributor. 
eThe supplier's winning price. 
fThe winning supplier. 
8The customer's gained utilities Value. 
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Appendix B 
Simulation Replications outputs with Negotiation 



































































































































































































































'Number of replications. 
2Supply network formation results "Biding/Negotiation/Fail". 
3The distributer's winning Price. 
4The winning distributor. 
5The supplier's winning price. 
6The winning supplier. 
7The customer's gained utilities Value. 
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